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Abstract
The first chapter examines consumer choices of health insurance contracts. An important innovation in health
insurance design is a high-deductible health plan paired with a health savings account (HSA). These contracts
aim to control costs by linking insurance coverage with tax incentives for saving, but their rules are highly
complex. How consumers perceive the features of these contracts may dampen any cost reduction and
produce unintended welfare effects by distorting plan choices. Using a novel administrative dataset linking
health insurance choices, medical claims, and saving in HSAs and 401(k)s from a large U.S. health insurer, I
develop and estimate a model that integrates HSA saving with deductible choices. I estimate over two-thirds
of the marginal HSA dollar is allocated to reduce the deductible, which counteracts the contract's cost-control
incentives and leads consumers to choose different insurance plans than they would without an HSA. In this
setting, using HSA contributions to offset higher deductibles produced no reduction in health care costs.
Several counterfactual analyses quantify the welfare implications of using the HSA to finance current costs on
moral hazard, plan enrollment and premiums, and the consumption smoothing benefits from insurance.
Health insurance contracts that require sophisticated consumer decision-making may work well in theory, but
may be less effective and lead to unintended consequences in practice.
The second chapter investigates how status affects health by comparing mortality between Gold and Silver
medalists in Olympic Track and Field. Contrary to conventional wisdom, winners die over two years earlier
than losers. Analysis of individual Census records of each athlete and his parents suggests that income is the
key mechanism: losers pursued higher-paying occupations than winners after the Olympics, while parental
earnings in childhood were similar. An athlete’s performance relative to expectations plays an auxiliary role,
but is much less important than income. The results suggest that how people respond to pivotal life events can
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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS IN THE ECONOMICS OF HEALTH, RISK, AND BEHAVIOR
Adam A. Leive
Jonathan Kolstad
The first chapter examines consumer choices of health insurance contracts. An im-
portant innovation in health insurance design is a high-deductible health plan paired
with a health savings account (HSA). These contracts aim to control costs by linking
insurance coverage with tax incentives for saving, but their rules are highly complex.
How consumers perceive the features of these contracts may dampen any cost reduc-
tion and produce unintended welfare e ects by distorting plan choices. Using a novel
administrative dataset linking health insurance choices, medical claims, and saving in
HSAs and 401(k)s from a large U.S. health insurer, I develop and estimate a model
that integrates HSA saving with deductible choices. I estimate over two-thirds of the
marginal HSA dollar is allocated to reduce the deductible, which counteracts the con-
tract’s cost-control incentives and leads consumers to choose di erent insurance plans
than they would without an HSA. In this setting, using HSA contributions to o set
higher deductibles produced no reduction in health care costs. Several counterfactual
analyses quantify the welfare implications of using the HSA to finance current costs
on moral hazard, plan enrollment and premiums, and the consumption smoothing
benefits from insurance. Health insurance contracts that require sophisticated con-
sumer decision-making may work well in theory, but may be less e ective and lead
to unintended consequences in practice.
The second chapter investigates how status a ects health by comparing mortality
iv
between Gold and Silver medalists in Olympic Track and Field. Contrary to conven-
tional wisdom, winners die over two years earlier than losers. Analysis of individual
Census records of each athlete and his parents suggests that income is the key mech-
anism: losers pursued higher-paying occupations than winners after the Olympics,
while parental earnings in childhood were similar. An athlete’s performance relative
to expectations plays an auxiliary role, but is much less important than income. The
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CHAPTER 1 : Health Insurance Design Meets Tax Incentives:
Consumer Responses to Complex Contracts
1.1. Introduction
Recent e orts to curb U.S. health care costs have centered on consumer decision-
making in insurance. An important and innovative health insurance contract is a
high-deductible health plan (HDHP) paired with a health savings account (HSA).
Compared to traditional insurance plans, HDHPs feature higher deductibles to en-
courage consumers to be more cost-conscious in their health care use. In return for
the higher deductible, consumers gain access to an HSA—a unique tax-preferred sav-
ings vehicle that functions like a 401(k) retirement plan, with the additional feature
that withdrawals for health care expenses are always tax-exempt. Many policymak-
ers and economists have championed these contracts as a market-based solution to
e ciently reduce health care costs.1 Collectively named “consumer-directed health
care,” HDHPs and HSAs now represent one-quarter of enrollment in the employer
health insurance market and are popular on many state insurance exchanges (Kaiser
Family Foundation 2015; Herman 2014). The A ordable Care Act’s “Cadillac Tax”
and limits on employee premiums will further accelerate HDHP adoption by discour-
aging more generous coverage.
However, the impact of HDHPs and HSAs on costs and welfare depends on the way
consumers perceive the features of these contracts, which are more complex than
other insurance products. The policy rationale of combining a high deductible with a
savings account is to provide consumers with protection from catastrophic risks, while
1For example, see Pauly and Goodman (1995); Council of Economic Advisors (2004); Feldstein
(2006); Bush (2006); Daniels (2010); Cogan, Hubbard, and Kessler (2011).
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increasing their sensitivity toward moderate costs because their own money is at stake
and all unused HSA funds roll over. This “use it or save it” provision of HSAs is a
key distinguishing feature from the “use it or lose it” provision of Flexible Spending
Accounts, but many consumers may be unaware of this attribute. In addition, HSAs
are the only health insurance contract that permits using tax-preferred saving for non-
health consumption, starting at age 65. In theory, this feature helps forward-looking
consumers internalize the total cost of care because purchasing current health care
with HSA funds subtracts from future income, bringing HSAs closer to the first-best
contingent-claims contract that smooths consumption without causing moral hazard
(Arrow 1963; Zeckhauser 1970; Feldstein 2005). In practice, though, consumers may
heavily discount the future or fail to recognize the substitutability between health care
and other goods from HSA saving. So while employers and insurers intend for the
contract to reduce costs through a higher deductible, consumers may view HSA saving
as a way to reduce the deductible, blunting the contract’s cost-control incentives.2
In this paper, I examine insurance plan and saving decisions to test whether consumers
use the HSA’s tax incentives to reduce the current deductible or to save for future
consumption. I extend a discrete choice model of insurance plans by integrating
HSA saving with deductible choices. There are two key parameters in this model.
The first is risk aversion, which is modeled as a random coe cient. The second is
a “marginal propensity to consume” (MPC) parameter measuring the proportion of
the marginal HSA dollar saved to finance current out-of-pocket costs versus future
consumption. This parameter summarizes the potential e ect of various economic
2A growing literature documents challenges in consumer-decision making in health care, including
understanding plan features (Loewenstein et al. 2013; Handel and Kolstad 2015), the dynamics of
prices when faced with non-linear contracts (Liebman and Zeckhauser 2008; Abaluck et al. 2015;
Dalton et al. 2015; Aaron-Dine et al. 2015), plan choices in complex choice environments (Abaluck
and Gruber 2011; Kling et al. 2012; Heiss et al. 2013; Bhargava et al. 2015), and the way prices are
framed on menus (Schmitz and Ziebarth 2015).
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fundamentals on insurance plan and utilization choices, including discounting, mental
accounting, and information frictions. For example, if consumers use HSAs to reduce
the deductible because of preferences for current consumption, this parameter will
capture discounting. If consumers view HSA funds as reserved for health care rather
than as fungible, this parameter will reflect mental accounting. While the parameter
may capture various optimization errors, there may also be rational reasons why
consumers fund HSAs to reduce short-term costs.3 Regardless of the underlying
economic mechanisms, what I call the MPC summarizes how HSAs influence insurance
plan choice and health care consumption, similar to how the marginal propensity to
consume out of income determines the fiscal multiplier in a macroeconomic model.
This new model of insurance choice nests the standard model as a special case, when
the MPC equals zero.
Identification of the choice model relies on an exogenous switch to HDHP coverage,
variation in prices (e.g. premiums, deductibles, tax rates, matching rates), and infor-
mation about preferences for retirement saving (e.g. 401(k) choices). Conditional on
401(k) saving, HSA saving should not di er across insurance plans if consumers view
the HSA as a retirement savings vehicle. In that case, insurance choices would be
equivalent to those from a standard model in which risk aversion is the only source
of preference heterogeneity. By contrast, a positive relationship between HSA saving
and the deductible chosen indicates consumers use the HSA partly to reduce current
health care costs. Observing 401(k) saving allows me to estimate the model’s pa-
rameters without estimating a fully structural life-cycle model of savings. I assume
any unobservables—such as beliefs about income processes or bequest motives—and
preferences for future consumption operate equivalently between the HSA and 401(k)
3For example, people may use the HSA to finance routine expenses or elective surgery—services
they would have consumed without an HSA but are now tax-subsidized.
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given the nearly identical structure and rules between the two accounts. Importantly,
this approach does not require assumptions about the optimality of 401(k) saving,
which may be violated in practice (Choi et al. 2011).4
I estimate this new model of insurance plan choice using a novel administrative dataset
on health insurance decisions, HSA saving, and 401(k) saving from a large U.S. health
insurer. This insurer replaced its traditional low-deductible insurance o erings ex-
clusively with HDHPs for its own employees and provided a menu of HDHPs to
choose between. In the years following the switch, the employer adjusted the menu
of its insurance deductibles, premiums, and matching rates for HSA contributions,
providing identifying variation in prices. I exploit variation in insurance premiums
to identify risk aversion separately from the MPC and variation in 401(k) saving to
identify the MPC separately from risk aversion. Detailed panel-level data includes
insurance deductible choices, contributions by both employees and employer to the
HSA and 401(k), medical and pharmacy claims of the employees and any dependents,
demographics, and information on salary and job characteristics. The choice model
incorporates distributions of health care costs at the time of plan and saving deci-
sions, which are constructed using the claims and other employee-level observable
characteristics. These detailed data, price variation, and the exogenous switch to
HDHPs/HSAs provide for clean identification of the choice model, which I estimate
via simulated maximum likelihood.5
4For the same reasons it is di cult to determine the optimality of 401(k) savings, I do not focus on
the optimality of HSA saving. However, there are some HSA saving decisions that are unambiguously
sub-optimal following revealed preference arguments. People who make 401(k) contributions in
excess of the employer match should be contributing the limit to their HSA, since the tax benefits of
the last HSA dollar are weakly better than for the last 401(k) dollar. In this setting, only 7.5 percent
of employees in this situation max out their HSA, providing some evidence that many people make
optimization errors.
5As described in detail in Section 4, premiums vary cross-sectionally by level of deductible (from
a menu of four choices) and family composition, and vary longitudinally as the employer raised the
deductibles o ered.
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I find that HSA saving is chosen primarily to reduce the current deductible, rather
than to save for future consumption. Sixty-eight cents of the marginal HSA dollar is
allocated towards paying for current out-of-pocket costs, with a 95 percent confidence
interval between 65 and 72 cents. HSA saving thus is largely used to counteract the
contract’s high deductible. In this setting, replacing traditional coverage exclusively
with HDHPs produced no reduction in health care costs because employees o set the
higher deductibles with HSA contributions. The model estimates risk aversion to be
3.5 ◊ 10≠4 on average, in line with previous literature, and is positively correlated
with the MPC. As a robustness test, a supplementary calibration using additional
data on HSA withdrawals obtains similar parameter estimates as the choice model.
The calibration takes advantage of the fact that HSA saving o ers a continuous choice
of insurance deductible, in e ect, when HSA contributions are chosen to reduce the
deductible. Taking the level of each observation’s HSA withdrawals as a measure
of contributions for current costs, the choice of deductible then point-identifies risk
aversion for each household conditional on its cost distribution and marginal tax rate.
Median risk aversion is estimated to be 2.4◊ 10≠4, close in magnitude to the choice
model estimates. The MPC is calculated as the ratio of HSA withdrawals to HSA
assets, with 69 cents of every HSA dollar being withdrawn in a given year. This
calibration provides supporting evidence that consumers treat HSAs primarily as a
way to reduce their deductible.
Using the HSA to pay for current costs has important implications for contract
choices, changes in health care consumption, and insurance premiums, which I illus-
trate through several counterfactual exercises. Each counterfactual treats the MPC
as “welfare-relevant” in that the parameter a ects consumer utility once enrolled in a
contract. In HDHPs with an HSA, a positive MPC a ects consumption decisions and
5
plan choices by serving as a price reduction. I consider two di erent counterfactual
plans as benchmarks: (1) a traditional insurance plan with 20 percent coinsurance,
representing the status quo; and (2) an HDHP without an HSA (in which the MPC
equals zero by construction), representing how the insurance deductible was intended
to function.
Changes in the perceived price of the HDHP from HSA saving can be translated
into moral hazard e ects. If the demand curve reflects the marginal benefit of care,
then the model’s estimates imply that HDHPs with an HSA are only 28 percent
as e ective at reducing moral hazard compared to an HDHP alone. In particular,
an HDHP with HSA reduces moral hazard by $125 compared to a $450 reduction
from an HDHP alone. Using the HSA to pay for current costs thus substantially
counteracts the cost control objective of the high deductible.6 At the same time, the
welfare impact of HSAs depends on consumer understanding of the health benefits
of care. If consumers misjudge the benefits from care or make other optimization
errors in their health care consumption decisions—which Baicker et al. (2015) define
as “behavioral hazard”—then the demand curve is no longer su cient to quantify
moral hazard. Consumers without knowledge of the health benefits from care may
actually be worse o  if they perceive the full price of care under the HDHP since they
may reduce services worth more than their cost. In the most comprehensive study to
date on health care consumption patterns with HDHPs, Brot-Goldberg et al. (2015)
document consumers cut all services, including valuable preventive care, once enrolled
in HDHPs. Depending on the extent to which consumers make such mistakes, HSA
saving may lead to health improvements relative to an HDHP without an HSA that
o set increases in moral hazard. In addition, reducing the deductible through HSA
6There is an established literature on the welfare consequences of moral hazard and tax subsi-
dies for insurance premiums beginning with Arrow (1963), Pauly (1968) and Feldstein (1973) and
reviewed by Finkelstein (2014).
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contributions provides $387 in consumption smoothing benefits, on average, compared
to an HDHP alone, but such gains are modest compared to the mean tax expenditure
of $591 on HSA contributions.
For a given menu of HDHP options, perceiving the HSA as a price reduction on the
deductible also leads to di erent HDHP choices. I demonstrate the influence of HSA
saving on deductible choices through a counterfactual that predicts market shares of
an HDHP with and without an HSA and the average costs of consumers selecting each
plan. In this setting, HSA saving attenuates any adverse selection based on health
risk compared to an HDHP without an HSA. Specifically, the incremental costs of the
set of consumers choosing more generous coverage relative to the highest deductible
is lower when contracts include an HSA. These di erences translate into premiums
for more generous coverage often being $1,000 lower for contracts with an HSA than
ones without an HSA.
This paper contributes to several strands of literature. First, it adds to a growing
literature on health insurance choices.7 By incorporating saving decisions into insur-
ance choices, the paper extends the standard insurance choice model beyond claim
probabilities and risk aversion, similar to recent work in health (Handel 2013; Han-
del and Kolstad 2015) and other contexts (Sydnor 2010; Barseghyan et al. 2013).
My model demonstrates the importance of incorporating HSA saving with deductible
choices when estimating consumer risk preferences and predicting plan choices. In
this setting, almost 30 percent of consumers switch insurance plans over a two-year
period.8 A standard model in which risk preferences, which are time-invariant, con-
7See e.g. Cardon and Hendel 2001; Carlin and Town 2009; Einav et al. 2010; Abaluck and Gruber
2011.
8This rate is high considering no plan was dominated, in contrast to other research documenting
lower switching rates in settings with dominated insurance plans (Handel 2013; Bhargava et al.
2015).
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stitute the only source of unobserved preference heterogeneity struggles to account
for such switching between plans. Instead, the standard model rationalizes choices by
estimating risk aversion that is implausibly large in magnitude, on average, and with
large plan- and time-specific shocks. Accounting for HSA contributions helps predict
choices, leading to a lower estimate of risk aversion and a substantial improvement
in the model’s fit to the data. The paper also relates to recent work documenting
challenges in consumer decision-making over non-linear health insurance contracts
(Liebman and Zeckhauser 2008; Abaluck et al. 2015; Dalton et al. 2015) and when
faced with complex choice environments (Kling et al. 2012; Bhargava et al. 2015).
The study adds to existing research on HDHPs that have focused on consumption re-
sponses, rather than HSA saving, and documented moderate cost reductions (Buntin
et al. 2011; Borah et al. 2011; Haviland et al. 2015; Brot-Goldberg et al. 2015). This
study shows that how consumers use HSAs to respond to higher deductibles can fully
o set any spending decline. In this way, the paper particularly complements Brot-
Goldberg et al. (2015) who find consumers react to the deductible in other ways that
undermine the contract’s objectives.
1.2. Background on HSAs
Created with the 2003 Medicare Modernization Act, an HSA is a portable finan-
cial account that must be paired with a HDHP. In 2016, the statutory minimum
deductible—the amount paid by the consumer before coverage begins—for a HDHP
was $1,300 for self coverage and $2,600 for family coverage. HSA account holders
cannot use their HSA if they switch to other types of health insurance while working.
HSA contributions roll over each year, unlike Flexible Spending Accounts (FSAs)
8
where the enrollee loses his unused balance at year’s end.9,10 Medicare beneficiaries
can make HSA withdrawals, but not contributions.
Health savings accounts, which are owned by individuals, o er a powerful savings
vehicle to finance both health care expenses and consumption in retirement. In many
ways, HSAs closely resemble 401(k)s as shown in Table 1.1: contributions to HSAs
are deductible from taxable income (“above the line”), interest grows tax-deferred,
and withdrawals for non-medical consumption are subject to income taxation and a
penalty if before age 65.11 HSAs also o er survivor benefits, similar to 401(k)s.12
However, HSAs provide superior tax advantages to 401(k)s since withdrawals at any
age to finance qualified medical care are not counted as taxable income. Qualified
expenses, which must be incurred after the HSA has been established, includes out-
of-pocket payments associated with a HDHP while working, as well as premiums for
Medicare, COBRA, or long-term care insurance.13 HSA balances cannot be used tax-
free to finance premiums for employer health insurance or Medigap (supplemental
insurance for Medicare’s out-of-pocket payments). Another tax advantage relative to
401(k)s is that employee contributions made as payroll deductions are not subject
9In October 2013, the Treasury Department announced FSA balances up to $500 could be rolled
over from one year to the next. My study studies pre-2010 choices, before this rule went into e ect.
10FSAs are compatible with traditional insurance and do not need to be paired with a HDHP
as HSAs do. HSAs are also distinguished from Health Reimbursement Arrangements (HRAs) and
Archer Medical Savings Accounts (MSAs). HRAs are owned by the employer, not the employee,
and cannot be invested. The employer funds the account for qualified expenses and may decide
whether HRA funds roll over from year to year or are forfeited at year’s end. HRAs do not have to
be paired with a HDHP. Archer MSAs, created as a pilot program in the mid-1990s, are more similar
to HSAs in that funds roll over, accounts are portable, and HDHP insurance is required. Eligibility
for Archer MSAs was restricted to self-employed or small employers (fewer than 50 employees) and
the pilot program ended in 2007.
11The penalty for early withdrawals was 10 percent before 2011, equal to that of 401(k) with-
drawals, and increased to 20 percent beginning in 2011.
12HSAs obtained through employers may or may not qualify as an ERISA plan, depending on the
employer’s involvement in the plan. HSAs not opened through an employer are considered personal
savings vehicles by the Department of Labor and not protected under ERISA.
13Until 2011, over-the-counter drugs without a prescription were included as qualified medical
expenses. Starting January 1, 2011, a prescription was needed for over-the-counter drugs to be
financed tax-free with HSA funds.
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to FICA taxes (Social Security and Medicare) and employer contributions are not
subject to FICA or FUTA (unemployment insurance) taxes. 14
In 2015, the annual HSA contribution limit including both employer and employee
contributions was $3,350 for self-only coverage and $6,650 for family coverage. These
limits, which the IRS increases over time for cost of living adjustments, rose from
$2,850 and $5,650, respectively, in 2007. Individuals over age 55 can also make annual
“catch-up” contributions of an extra $1,000 in 2015 to their HSAs, up from $800 per
year in 2007.15 By way of comparison, the IRS’s annual limit on employee 401(k)
elective deferrals was $18,000 in 2015 and employers could provide an additional
$53,000 in defined contributions to an employee’s 401(k) in the same year.
While HSA saving limits are substantially lower than 401(k) limits, the costs of health
care in retirement is large enough for the average consumer to consider HSAs as sen-
sible tool for long-term saving. On average, Medicare beneficiaries spend close to
$5,000 annually out-of-pocket on premiums, long-term care facilities, and other ser-
vices (Cubanksi et al. 2014). The net present value of out-of-pocket expenses not
covered by Medicare at age 65 has been estimated at between $220,000 and $376,000
dependent on the time period and whether long-term care is included (Fronstin et al.
2008; Webb and Zhivan 2010; Yamamoto 2013; Fidelity 2014). Since there is a dis-
tribution around these costs, risk-averse workers will want to save more than these
14A policyholder can also pay out-of-pocket (with taxable savings or current income) for health
expenses while enrolled in an HSA, save the receipts, and reimburse herself from the HSA at any
time in the future, even decades later. In e ect, this strategy transforms part of the HSA balance
into a Roth IRA because taxes are paid on the out-of-pocket payments while working, interest earned
on HSA balances is tax-exempt, and the HSA withdrawal in the future is tax-exempt.
15Between 2004 and 2006, annual HSA contributions were limited to the lesser of the statutory
maximum or the chosen deductible. This restriction biases contribution and deductible choices to
be positively correlated. This rule was repealed on December 20, 2006 by the Tax Relief and Health
Care Act of 2006. As described in Section 4, I exclude employees who opened an HSA prior to 2008
from my analysis to avoid introducing possible correlation between deductible and saving choices
induced by legislation.
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averages to guard against high cost realizations. For example, Webb et al. (2010)
estimate that out-of-pocket costs exceed $570,000 with a five percent probability in
2009—the last year of my sample period. In order to finance these costs with HSA
funds, a consumer would need to fully fund his HSA without any withdrawals while
working. This comparison is important because it indicates the average consumer
can meaningfully trade-o  current versus future health care consumption in making
HSA choices.16
Since their creation in 2004, HSAs have grown to include 14 million accounts and
assets of $25 billion, with the majority of accounts opening since 2011 (Fronstin
2014). The take-up of HDHPs and HSAs has increased dramatically over the last
decade, covering 20 percent of people who obtain insurance through their employer
(KFF 2014). Over one-quarter of firms now o er an HDHP/HSA option, and nearly
half of large firms (with over 1,000 workers) do. Despite their increased popularity,
contributions, have been modest. Based on the Employee Benefits Research Institute
(EBRI) database comprising one fifth of accounts and assets nationwide, the average
contribution (including employer contributions) in 2014 was about $2,000 for self
and family coverage combined.17 Roughly 10 percent of account holders contributed
the maximum amount (Fronstin 2015a). On average, account balances amounted to
$2,077 in 2014, up from $1,320 in 2007. Among accounts open at least five years, the
average balance was $3,092 (Fronstin 2015a). The large majority of accounts is not
invested in financial markets (Fronstin 2015b).18 In a first study using tax records,
16Although there is some debate about whether Americans are prepared for retirement (see e.g.
Engen et al. (1999), Scholz et al. (2006), Hurst (2008), Munnell et al. (2014))), there is consensus
that risks to health represent an important component in retirement saving decisions. Both the
direct cost of poor health in terms of medical care and the indirect costs, such as the inability to
substitute home production for purchased goods, reduce assets of retirees (Skinner 2007; Poterba
et al. 2010; DeNardi et al. 2010).
17Half of HSA accounts receive employer contributions (Fronstin 2014).
18Keeping HSA funds in low-yield saving accounts may reflect account rules on minimum balances
or a lack of consumer information. However, since money is fungible, such behavior may actually be
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Helmchen et al. (2015) find older and higher-income workers opened and fully funded
their HSAs more often than did younger and lower-income workers.19
Evidence of how HDHPs a ect health care costs is still emerging, but it points to
moderate declines in spending compared to traditional insurance of around 15 percent
(Buntin et al. 2011; Borah et al. 2011; Haviland et al. 2015; Brot-Goldberg et al. 2015).
In one setting, the move from no out-of-pocket payments to an HDHP produced
spending cuts across all services (Brot-Goldberg et al. 2015). Many consumers do
not appear to be forward-looking even over the course of a year: those with low
shadow prices based on their expected spending relative to the deductible reduced
spending while below the deductible, thus reacting to spot prices instead. If such
demand responses reflect behavioral hazard as well as moral hazard (Baicker et al.
2015), then such documented consumption drops cannot quantitatively estimate a
reduction in moral hazard.
Limited research exists on how employees fund HSAs in relation to 401(k)s or how
HSAs interact with deductible choices. Parente and Feldman (2008) find a weak
positive correlation between contributions to HSAs and other tax-deferred retirement
saving vehicles among one set of University employees. Yet, their sample included just
63 HSA accounts from a sample of 16,000—a take-up rate of just 0.4 percent—and
their results were not robust to alternative specifications. Analyzing over 160,000 ac-
counts held at United Health Group and OptumHealth Bank, Chen et al. (2013) also
took a descriptive approach and found HSA contributions were negatively correlated
with employer contributions and positively correlated with age, income, education,
a financially savvy investment strategy if consumers can rebalance their 401(k) and IRA by selling
bonds and cash, keeping their total asset allocation unchanged, because HSAs provide option value
before retirement in terms of tax-free withdrawals for medical care.
19Many states exclude HSA assets in determining Medicaid eligibility, so low contributions among
lower-income workers are likely not due to consideration about Medicaid enrollment.
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and health care spending. They estimated a positive but insignificant correlation
with the deductible, and they lacked data on 401(k)s or other saving accounts. Peter
and Steinorth (2012) simulated a life-cycle model where health care spending and
lifespan were stochastic (with certain labor income), but made the assumption that
individuals max out contributions, which is at odds with observed contribution levels.
Other studies on HSAs focused on the choice of insurance plan, comparing traditional
insurance to a high-deductible health plan (Cardon and Showalter, 2007; Steinorth,
2011; Handel, 2013; Handel and Kolstad, 2015), but did not study saving decisions.
Cardon and Showalter (2001) discuss the role of FSA contributions as supplemen-
tal insurance coverage, which also applies to HSAs, and Cardon (2012) analytically
modeled how FSA contributions could reduce optimal deductible choices. As I show
in the next section, using HSA funds as supplemental coverage can increase or de-
crease deductible choices depending on risk aversion and HSA balances, because HSA
funds do not expire, unlike with FSAs. Peter et al. (2015) theoretically analyzed HSA
saving and utilization choices but did not focus on HSAs as a tool to reduce moral
hazard.
1.3. A Model of Insurance Choice and HSA Saving
1.3.1. The standard model of insurance plan choice
In the U.S., employers can elect to o er health insurance plans to their labor force.
Given that menu, employees select a health insurance contract that pays a portion of
health care costs in return for an insurance premium. The simplest form of contract
provides for full coverage once the employee has paid a deductible, with a higher
insurance premium charged for a lower deductible. These are the plans o ered in my
setting. In the neoclassical model of insurance choice, employees choose the plan that
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maximizes expected utility given their risk aversion, claim probability, and marginal
tax rate. I follow the plan choice literature in assuming preferences satisfy constant
absolute risk aversion (CARA), so that for consumption x, u(x) = ≠ 1“ e≠“x, where “
is the coe cient of absolute risk aversion.20 For family k in year t, a consumption
draw under insurance plan j is specified as:
xjk = (yk ≠ ﬁj) (1≠ ·k)≠OOPjk (1.1)
where yk denotes income, ﬁj denotes the plan premium, ·k is the family’s marginal
tax rate, and OOPjk is an out-of-pocket realization under plan j based on family k’s
ex ante cost distribution Fk. The equation reflects the tax preference for insurance
that allow premiums to be paid with pre-tax dollars, while out-of-pocket payments
are paid with after-tax dollars. Employees have a discrete choice of J insurance plans






exp (≠“xjk) dFk (OOPjk) (1.2)
For a given cost distribution F and marginal tax rate · , the choice of plan identifies a
set of risk aversion for each employee consistent with expected utility maximization,
because there is a finite menu of insurance contracts to choose from. If employees
could instead choose from a continuous menu of insurance contracts, then the choice
of deductible would point-identify risk aversion for each employee conditional on his
cost distribution and tax rate.
20See e.g. Einav et al. (2013); Handel (2013); Handel and Kolstad (2015).
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1.3.2. Insurance choice with HSAs
HSA contributions can represent saving for short-term health care costs or saving to
finance any form of consumption (including health care) in the future. If HSAs are
used to pay for current health care costs, the chosen contribution will be related to the
choice of insurance deductible and the size of existing HSA balances. If, instead, HSA
contributions represent saving for future consumption, there will be no link between
HSA saving and deductible choices because no HSA funds will be withdrawn regard-
less of current out-of-pocket payments incurred. In this case, employees would treat
their HSA like a 401(k) for retirement consumption. This section makes these ideas
precise and incorporates HSA saving into the standard model of insurance choice.
First consider HSA contributions for short-term health care costs. HSAs then serve
as a way to reduce the deductible. In e ect, HSAs provide a continuous choice of
insurance contract by allowing people to supplement their existing coverage through
tax-preferred contributions.21 Specifically, people can purchase a dollar of additional
coverage at a premium equal to 1 minus their marginal tax rate. In this way, HSA
contributions to reduce the deductible function as “deductible insurance.” Figure
1.1 below displays the schedule of out-of-pocket payments versus medical expenses
for a $3,000 deductible and di erent levels of HSA contributions. With no HSA
contribution, the insurance contract is represented by the solid black line where the
employee pays for all costs until $3,000, and the plan pays for any additional costs.
If used as deductible insurance, HSA contributions shift the benefit schedule down
towards the horizontal axis. Any level set within the shaded area is now a feasible
contract. For example, the dashed line denotes an HSA contribution of $1,000, so that
the first $1,000 of costs are paid with pre-tax HSA funds, the next $2,000 of costs are
21The intuition is similar to Medigap insurance for Medicare’s out-of-pocket payments.
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paid from after-tax funds, and costs beyond $3,000 are paid by the insurance plan.
When used to reduce the current deductible, HSA contributions h now represent a
second insurance premium by making the consumption draw:
xjk(h|ﬁ, ·) = (yk ≠ ﬁj ≠ hjk) (1≠ ·k)≠OOPjk +min {OOPjk, hjk}¸ ˚˙ ˝
HSA withdrawal
(1.3)
Each OOP realization may now be financed with pre-tax funds withdrawn from the
HSA, represented by the last term. This formulation nests the standard model rep-
resented in equation (1) as a special case when h = 0.
In my setting, the employer matches the first L dollars of employee contributions
according to a rate m, where m = 1 denotes a dollar-for-dollar match. For a given
HSA contribution, a higher match rate provides for additional coverage, so that a
consumption draw is then represented as:
xjk(h|ﬁ, ·,m, L) = (yk ≠ ﬁj ≠ hjk) (1≠ ·k)≠OOPk (1.4)
+min {OOPk,min [hjk(1 +mk), hjk +mkLk]}
The consumer then chooses the insurance deductible and HSA contribution that max-
imizes expected utility.
When used to reduce the deductible, HSAs are treated like FSAs. There is addi-
tionally some option value from HSA contributions that roll over if unused, unlike
FSA contributions. Yet this option value is likely small because consumers can make
additional HSA contributions over and above their payroll deductions. So a consumer
planning to use his HSA to finance short-term costs could make a small payroll contri-
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bution and then contribute more upon incurring medical expenses. In addition, there
is little option value from building up HSA assets to hedge against future deductible
increases because the deductible is never larger than the statutory maximum HSA
contribution in this setting. Consequently, an employee is never at risk for paying
more out-of-pocket than he could contribute to his HSA that same year. Modeling
insurance plan choices in a static framework therefore does not omit an important
continuation value term that would be present in a dynamic model.
If contributions are used only to save for future consumption, there is no relationship
between HSA saving and current out-of-pocket costs because no funds will be with-
drawn today. There would therefore also be no link between deductible choices and
HSA saving. HSAs will be more e ective at reducing moral hazard if they are used
as a long-term savings vehicle, because consumers would trade o  health care versus
other consumption.
To quantitatively measure this e ect, I introduce a parameter ÷ as the proportion of
HSA funding allocated to financing current health care costs. This MPC parameter
allows consumers to save for both short-term costs and future consumption, with
÷ = 1 indicating all funding allocated to current costs, ÷ = 0 indicating all funding
allocated to future costs, and an intermediate value indicating a mixture. The higher
is ÷, the more the HSA functions as a price reduction for current health care costs.
Denoting HSA balances for family k as Hk, a consumption draw is then represented
as
xjk = (yk ≠ ﬁj ≠ hjk) (1≠ ·k)≠OOPk (1.5)
+min {OOPk, ÷ (Hk +min [hjk(1 +mk), hjk +mkLk])}
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Risk aversion and the MPC are the two parameters we need to estimate in this model.
These parameters do not enter additively, because consumption, which is a function
of the MPC, is multiplied by risk aversion. Separately identifying the two parameters
requires exploiting sources of variation that independently a ect risk aversion but
not the MPC, and vice versa. For example, variation in premiums, which a ects
the demand for di erent deductibles but not for HSA saving, identifies risk aversion
separately from the MPC. Variation in 401(k) saving identifies the MPC separately
from risk aversion: when used to save for retirement, HSA saving will be related to
401(k) saving, but 401(k) saving should be unrelated to deductible choices. Other
sources of price variation, including the deductibles o ered, the employer’s matching
rates for HSA contributions and the employee’s marginal tax rate, influence both plan
choice and the level of HSA saving and provide additional sources of identification.
In my setting, the employer fully replaced its traditional insurance with HDHPs and
HSAs and it then varied the price of its deductibles and matching rates over time
and across employees. The empirical variation and details of the administrative data
are presented in Section 4. Identification and estimation of the model is presented
in Section 6. Before explaining the identifying variation and setting background in
detail, I first graphically display the implications of HSA saving decisions on insurance
plan choice.
1.3.3. An illustration of the HSA model on plan choices
If used to pay for current health care costs, HSAs can induce di erent insurance
plan choices compared to the standard model. The intuition is that HSAs reduce
the financial risk from uncertain consumption associated with paying out-of-pocket
payments below the deductible. HSAs can induce di erent choices in two ways. First,
people planning to finance out-of-pocket costs from a large HSA balance may choose
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a higher deductible than without an HSA, since the higher deductible comes with
a lower premium. Second, if HSA balances are small or zero, a person may choose
a lower deductible than without an HSA. In e ect, HSA contributions function as
self-insurance against the deductible. Although he would then pay higher premiums,
he could experience utility gains from consumption smoothing under su ciently high
risk aversion. These examples are now illustrated graphically.
Figure 2.1 displays the deductible chosen based on the HSA plan choice model, as-
suming a coe cient of absolute risk aversion “ of 2.5◊10≠4.22 The figure plots choices
for the highest and lowest cost distributions for females aged 35-44 using the 2008
menu of premiums and deductibles. The size of HSA balances are plotted on the
horizontal axis and the MPC is plotted on the vertical axis. The predictions of the
standard model correspond to ÷ = 0. For the high cost distribution (Panel A), the
standard model predicts a deductible choice of $1,250. For ÷ > 0, though, di erent
combinations of balances and ÷ can induce higher deductible choices. For the median
cost distribution (Panel B), the $1,750 deductible is chosen in the standard model
where ÷ = 0. If ÷ > 0, however, then the size of balances can influence which plan is
chosen. If balances are zero and ÷ exceeds 0.15, then the lowest deductible plan will
be chosen instead of the second-lowest deductible. If, instead, ÷ is high but balances
are large, then one of the two highest deductible plans will be chosen.
22This level of risk aversion is consistent with recent estimates from the literature that separate risk
preferences from information frictions or beliefs about expenditure risk Handel and Kolstad (2015).
Earlier studies estimate higher levels of risk aversion while acknowledging that econometric models
that do not model all elements of the decision process often rationalize choices with implausibly high
risk aversion (see e.g. Sydnor 2010).
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1.4. Setting and Data
The company is a top-5 health insurer by both market share and revenues in the U.S.
with employees throughout the country. In terms of representativeness, the aver-
age salary, age, and tenure among the company’s employees are roughly in line with
U.S. labor force averages, but about 70 percent of employees are female, substan-
tially higher than many other settings. The clean variation in a menu of insurance
deductibles and prices makes this setting particularly important for studying insur-
ance and saving choices. Between 2005 and 2011, the company made changes to its
health insurance and retirement saving programs for its own 20,000 employees. It
fully replaced its standard insurance contracts with HDHPs in 2008, introducing a
menu of HDHP o erings that were di erentiated only in the size of the deductible and
were otherwise equivalent (e.g. provider networks were identical). I study saving and
insurance decisions of the company’s employees in 2008 and 2009 to isolate variation
in policies related to the company’s HSA program.23
In 2005, the company began o ering employees the choice of HDHPs in addition to
traditional health insurance plans. Both types of plans featured relatively simple
benefit designs and had identical provider networks. The traditional insurance plans
o ered first-dollar coverage for physician o ce visits and prescription drugs. Patients
paid $25 or $40 copayments for o ce visits and received an allowance for each drug fill
that varied by tier of the drug. Preventive care—immunizations, physical exams, and
certain cancer screening—was free of charge. Patients paid 100 percent out-of-pocket
for hospital care and other services until they reached their deductibles. Beyond the
23Prior to 2007, U.S. law stipulated that HSA contributions could not exceed the chosen insurance
plan’s deductible, which biases contribution and deductible choices to be positively correlated. This
law was removed in December 2006, but I exclude employees who enrolled in the HSA prior to 2008
since they may have been unaware of the rule change.
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deductible, the plan paid for all costs, excluding copayments for o ce visits which the
patient still paid each visit. In the HDHP plan, preventive care was also free and the
patient paid the full charge for all other care (physician visits, drugs, hospital care,
etc.) until the deductible had been met. After the deductible was met, the plan paid
for all charges. In 2008, the company dropped its traditional insurance plans and
only o ered HDHP plans to its employees. Employees had to make an active choice
of insurance plan each year during open enrollment. There was no default option.
The menu of HDHP deductibles ranged from $1,250 to $3,000 for employee-only
coverage and double that for family coverage. Plans di ered only in their premium
and size of the deductible, both of which varied over time. The employer contributed
a flat amount to each plan premium and then required employees to pay higher costs
of additional coverage. Figure 3.1 plots the benefits (spending less premiums and
out-of-pocket payments) for insurance plans in 2008 for self-coverage.
Only employees who chose an HDHP plan could open an HSA. There is no default
employee contribution to the HSA, unlike with the 401(k). Employees are immediately
vested for both their contributions and the employer’s contributions. The employer
matches employee HSA contributions at di erent rates and up to di erent limits based
on employees’ salary levels over time. Matching rates by year and salary levels are
shown in Table 1.2. The price of a dollar contributed by the employee is 11+m , where
m is the proportion matched by the employer.
The HSA operates as both a low-interest rate savings account and an investment
account. Once balances reach $2,000, HSA assets can be invested in a variety of mu-
tual funds provided the amount invested exceeds $1,000 and remains above this level.
There are no initial setup fees or monthly fees for the HSA account or the investment
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account paid by the employee.24 Low fees and the ability to invest in mutual funds
are important, because they rule out the argument that consumers should rationally
not use their HSA for retirement saving if investment opportunities are poor and
transaction costs are high. Employees are given a debit card to make withdrawals
from the non-investment portion of their HSA, which reduces the transaction costs
of using HSA funds compared to filing paperwork.
The company pursued an extensive communications campaign to inform employees
about the HDHP o erings and HSA program. This e ort included materials and pro-
grams to aid employees in analyzing insurance options and monitoring expenditures.
Employees received an annual “Smart Summary” with details on their spending pat-
terns and indicating alternative plans or therapies that may save costs. The employer
also provided online budgeting tools, cost calculators, and other resources on their
insurance and saving products.
In terms of retirement benefits, the company o ered employees a defined-contribution
401(k) and matched employee contributions up to 6 percent of salary. Prior to 2008,
the company matched all employee contributions at 50 percent up to this threshold.
Starting in 2008, the company began matching the first percent of employee salary 100
percent and then matched subsequent contributions at 50 percent, up to 6 percent of
salary (so that the maximum employer contribution increased from 3 to 3.5 percent of
salary). Employee contributions were deducted from each period’s paycheck. Unlike
with the HSA, the employer provided a higher match limit in absolute dollars to
higher salaried workers because the 401(k) match was based on a percentage of salary.
If employees did not actively enroll in the 401(k) when they were hired, they were
auto-enrolled at a salary contribution of 4 percent, also deducted from each period’s
24The investment account charges a $20 transaction fee when funds are purchased and sold and a
$25 fee if there is no activity for 12 continuous months.
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paycheck.25 401(k) accounts were charged a periodic administrative fee equal to a
variable percentage of the balance.
The administrative data includes detailed information on each employee’s salary, job
characteristics, demographics, medical and pharmacy claims, and choices about re-
tirement saving and health insurance plans. Information on job characteristics and
geographic location is measured once in 2011, while information on salary, retirement
saving and health insurance choices, and medical and pharmacy claims are measured
repeatedly over time. 401(k) contributions (both by the employee and employer) and
balances are measured annually. HSA variables—contributions by both the employee
and employer, employee withdrawals, balances, and interest—are measured monthly.
I aggregate HSA contributions and balances to annual levels to accord with the 401(k)
data. Insurance choices are measured annually, and employees could not switch plans
during the year.
The claims data includes information on health expenditure for employees and any
dependents covered under the employee’s policy. Each claim provides detailed infor-
mation on diagnoses (ICD-9 codes for medical claims and NDC codes for pharmacy
claims), providers, and payment (e.g. patient paid, plan paid), and dates of payment.
The employer developed its own estimate of the employee’s health expenditure risk,
which is captured in a variable called the “severity score.”
Using the severity score and the medical and pharmacy claims, I construct distribu-
tions of expenditure risk for each employee and his or her dependents. This procedure
follows the approach of other studies of insurance plan choices (Handel 2013; Handel
and Kolstad 2015). As an overview, the strategy is to group people with similar health
25In 2011, the company introduced an “auto-escalation” policy that increased the employee’s
401(k) contribution from 4 to 5 percent for those who did not actively enroll upon hiring and did
not change their contribution in the following two years.
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risks in year t together and use the distribution of actual expenditures from year t+1
to generate beliefs about expenditure risk at the time the insurance plan was chosen in
year t. Each person in the same risk group is assumed to have the same beliefs about
his health risk. More specifically, I first group each insured individual into 60 di erent
risk groups based on his age, sex, and severity score. I do not construct separate risk
groups by year due to sample size limitations. For each of the 60 risk groups, I record
the empirical proportion of individuals with zero expenditures the following year. For
those with positive expenditures the following year, I fit a Weibull distribution to the
observed expenditure, estimating the shape and scale parameters of this distribution.
I exclude expenditures on preventive care since it was covered free of charge by all
plans. I also only consider claims from in-network providers, which comprise nearly
all spending. For each risk group, I then construct a “modified” Weibull distribution
using the group’s estimated shape and scale parameters for positive expenditure and
the empirical probability of zero expenditures. For each risk group, I take 100 draws
from their corresponding modified Weibull distribution. Within each family, I sum
the expenditures for each draw so that each family has 100 draws corresponding to
the sum of expenditures for each of its members from that particular draw. This
statistical object represents the family’s beliefs about its total expenditure risk. The
family’s out-of-pocket risk is then constructed by applying the insurance plan’s de-
ductible to each expenditure draw. In this setting, out-of-pocket payments simply
equal spending if below the deductible, and the deductible if spending exceeds the
deductible.
1.4.1. Sample composition
The analysis sample is constructed by starting with all employees appearing in the
employer’s Human Resource records in plan years 2008 or 2009 and taking advantage
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of the key variation in the data related to the HSA program. I restrict the sample
to those who are (i) enrolled in one of the company’s health insurance plans, (ii) did
not switch the number of covered dependents during the year on their insurance plan,
(iii) had coverage the entire year when insured, (iv) participated in the HSA program
after 2008 and did not have an HSA prior to 2008, (v) actively enrolled in the 401(k),
and (vi) were younger than age 59. Restrictions (i) - (iii) are simply to isolate those
whose insurance status is not fragmented (16,636 employees). I exclude employees
who opened an HSA prior to 2008 because although the law tying the maximum
contribution to the lesser of the deductible or the statutory limit was repealed in
December 2006, some employees with an HSA may not have been aware of this rule
change. The contribution decisions of employees who did not open an HSA prior
to 2008 are less likely to be biased by the old rules governing plan contributions.
I exclude the 20 percent of remaining employees who passively default into saving
4 percent in their 401(k) because my economic model of HSA saving views 401(k)
saving as a reflection of inter-temporal preferences and retirement saving objectives.
This approach requires employees make an active decision of how much to save in
their 401(k), rather than be auto-enrolled in the 401(k). I finally exclude the small
number of remaining employees aged 59 years and older because 401(k) assets can be
withdrawn penalty free for any reason starting at age 5912 . After these restrictions,
the sample size totals 5,314 employees.
Table 1.3 presents summary statistics of the analysis sample, overall and by type of
insurance coverage. The average age is 39 years, the average tenure with the firm is 6.4
years, and the average salary is $54,517. Seventy-one percent of the sample is female.
Annual HSA saving, including employer contributions, averages $1,279 for self-only
coverage and $2,410 for family coverage. Over 96 percent of the sample receives the
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full employer HSA match and 3 percent contribute the maximum to their HSAs. By
way of comparison, 43 percent receive the full employer 401(k) match and just under 2
percent contribute the maximum to their 401(k)s. The lower contribution thresholds
for the HSA explain the higher share of employees obtaining the full HSA match.
For each account, the large majority of employees are not at a corner solution of
contributing zero or the maximum amount. Comparing withdrawals to contributions,
nearly 80 percent of funds are withdrawn during this two-year period. On a per capita
basis (rather than dollar-weighted), the average share of funds withdrawn is around
70 percent. That statistic points to consumers using HSAs to save for current medical
costs, rather than future consumption.
The menu of premiums, deductibles, and enrollment by plan is presented in Table
1.4. For both self and family coverage, the lowest deductible plan was most popular
in both years, with the highest deductible as the second-most popular plan. The
lowest market shares for the two middle plans is consistent with the benefit schedule
plotted in Figure 3.1. Importantly, nearly 30 percent of consumers switch between
the four deductible tiers over two years, with roughly equal numbers increasing and
lowering their deductibles. This high switching rate is remarkable, considering that
no plan was dominated, in contrast to other research documenting lower switching
rates in settings with dominated plans (Handel 2013, Bhargava, Loewenstein, Sydnor
2015).26
26It is worth noting that even before HDHPs were introduced, the rate of switching was 26
percent, still very high compared to other contexts. During this time, employees had access to a
non-portable, employer-funded spending account that enabled unused dollars to roll over—similar
to an HSA without the retirement savings option. Experience with this account may explain the
observed switching rates prior to HDHPs and HSAs.
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1.5. Descriptive Evidence
Before estimating the plan choice model, this section presents descriptive regressions
of plan and saving choices showing that consumers use HSAs to finance short-term
health care costs. These regressions include other endogenous choices (either de-
ductible or saving choices) as explanatory variables and so should not be interpreted
as causal, but two key correlations provide evidence supporting the argument that
HSAs are not used solely to finance future consumption. First, higher HSA balances
at the start of the year are negatively correlated with subsequent HSA contributions.
As a placebo test, there is no relationship between 401(k) balances and subsequent
401(k) saving, which is expected since 401(k)s are largely used for retirement sav-
ing. Second, higher HSA balances are correlated with higher deductible choices. In
addition, there is no evidence that the introduction of HSAs crowds out 401(k) sav-
ing, consistent with using the HSA to finance current health care costs. I also test
whether the MPC equals 1 and whether the MPC equals 0 using data on HSA saving
and withdrawals, rejecting the null in both cases. Finally, I show evidence that health
care spending did not decline after traditional coverage was replaced with HDHPs and
HSAs.
1.5.1. Reduced-form regressions of HSA and 401(k) saving
Table 1.5 presents the results OLS regressions of employee HSA saving with employee
and year fixed e ects. The regressions take the following form:
ykt = –+ —1Hkt + —2Dkt + —3pHSAkt + —4Kkt + —5p401kkt +X” + Îk + ‚t + Ákt (1.6)
where ykt denotes employee HSA saving of employee k in year t, H denotes HSA
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balances and K denotes 401(k) balances at the beginning of year t, pHSA denotes the
price of HSA contributions and p401k the price of 401(k) contributions—defined as
1
1+m where m is the corresponding matching rate, Dkt represents the (endogenous)
chosen deductible, Îk denotes employee fixed e ects, ‚t denotes time fixed e ects, and
Ákt represents a normally distributed random error. The vector of controls X includes
expected health spending, a cubic in age, indicators for salary, job tenure, number of
dependents, and an indicator for family coverage.27
The key coe cients of interest are —1 and —2. A negative sign on —ˆ1 would indi-
cate that future HSA contributions are o set against existing balances, and point
to HSAs being used for short-term costs. A positive sign on —ˆ2 would also suggest
that HSA contributions are designed for current consumption. In one specification,
I drop the deductible and HSA balance variables and instead include expected out-
of-pocket payments less existing HSA balances, which combines both variables using
each employee’s estimated distribution of out-of-pocket costs. In placebo regressions,
I estimate models of 401(k) contributions as the dependent variable to test whether
—ˆ4 = 0, which would be consistent with 401(k)s being treated as retirement saving.
In regressions of HSA saving, the coe cient estimate on beginning-year HSA balances
is negative, large in magnitude, and highly significant (Table 1.5, columns 1-3). A
dollar increase in HSA balances is associated with a 30 cent reduction in that year’s
HSA contribution. Measured in logs, a doubling of the HSA balance is associated
with a 5.9 percent reduction in that year’s HSA saving. Since the company’s system
prompts employees to choose a dollar amount of HSA saving (rather than a percentage
of salary as with the 401(k)) and because the deductible is also measured in dollars,
27I include the level of current 401(k) saving rather than its lag in order to capture the e ect of
contemporaneous shocks that could lead to revising saving plans from one year to the next. I later
document that HSA saving does not appear to crowd-out 401(k) saving.
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the levels interpretation is a more natural representation of the employee’s choice
problem. Nonetheless, the key qualitative result—that higher starting balances o set
contributions—is similar regardless of functional form, which suggests most people
treat HSAs to finance current out-of-pocket costs. The estimated positive sign on
expected OOP risk less HSA balances (Column 2) also points to this conclusion. The
estimates from placebo regressions of 401(k) saving in Columns 4 and 5 of Table 1.5
demonstrate beginning-year 401(k) balances do not have a strong association with
that year’s 401(k) contribution. This weak correlation is expected since 401(k)s are
designed as long-term saving vehicles.
1.5.2. Reduced-form regressions of plan choices
The second set of descriptive regressions study how HSA balances and saving relate
to plan choice. I run fixed e ects logit regressions that specify the probability of
choosing the highest deductible as:
Pr(DHIGHkt = 1|Îk, —) =
exp (Îk + xkt—)
1 + exp (Îk + xkt—)
(1.7)
where DHIGHkt is a binary variable equal to 1 if the highest deductible is chosen and
0 otherwise, Îk is a an employee fixed e ect, and and xkt represents the vector of
regressors that include HSA and 401(k) balances and contributions, expected health
risk, and other controls appearing in Table 1.5. I also run the same regression with the
lowest deductible chosen as the dependent variable. The first two columns of Table
6 present odds ratios of choosing the lowest and highest deductibles, respectively.
Since the estimation only uses information from observations where the dependent
variable changes over time, I combine self and family coverage to increase sample
size. Based on the estimates, a one-standard deviation increase in the HSA balance
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at the beginning of the year is associated with a 15 percent reduction in the odds
of choosing the lowest deductible and a 10 percent increase in the odds of choosing
the highest deductible. By way of comparison, a one standard deviation increase in
expected health spending increases the odds of choosing the lowest deductible by 42
percent and reduces the odds of choosing the highest deductible by 40 percent. Using
deciles of expected health spending yields similar qualitative results. Other saving
variables are not statistically significant predictors of plan choice.
Since plans di er only in the size of their deductibles, I also run ordered logit models
with the deductible as the dependent variable. The regressions now exploit between-
employee variation and include indicators for being married and white in addition
to the controls included in Columns 1 and 2. The coe cient estimates for self and
family coverage are presented separately in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 1.6. Higher
HSA balances are again correlated with higher deductibles.
To gauge the magnitude of the ordered logit estimates on HSA balances, I calculate the
probability that each plan in 2009 is selected at di erent levels of beginning-year HSA
balances, holding all other variables at their means. As shown in Table 1.7, moving
from an HSA balance of zero to the sample’s mean balance is associated with a roughly
3 percentage point decrease in the probability of choosing the lowest deductible and
a 2 percentage point increase in choosing the highest deductible. Moving from a zero
balance to the 95th percentile lowers the probability of choosing the lowest deductible
by almost 10 percentage points and increases the probability of choosing the highest
deductible by roughly 8 percentage points for both coverage types The magnitude of
these changes in deductible choices is large, similar to results from the fixed e ects
logit.
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1.5.3. Crowd-out of 401(k) saving
There is little evidence that 401(k) saving declines after HSAs are introduced. The
apparent absence of 401(k) crowd-out is consistent with using HSAs to finance short-
term health care costs. In results not shown, there is no statistically significant
relationship between total tax-preferred saving—defined as the sum of 401(k) and
HSA saving—and the introduction of HSAs. Nevertheless, HSAs raise the interest rate
on saving, so this weak correlation could result from o setting income and substitution
e ects. The unavailability of data on other assets prevents me from examining this
question.28 Yet the observation that 401(k) saving did not drop after the introduction
of HSAs is consistent with the use of HSAs as a short-term savings vehicle.
1.5.4. Tests of MPC=0 and MPC=1
Before estimating the MPC using a structural model of insurance plan choice, it is
instructive to test the two extreme cases that HSA funds are treated like 401(k)s—in
which the MPC equals 0—or are treated like FSAs—in which the MPC equals 1. One
approach to test these hypotheses is to compare HSA withdrawals to out-of-pocket
costs and HSA balances. Define M as the minimum of out-of-pocket costs and HSA
assets (beginning-year balances plus current contributions). When HSA assets exceed
out-of-pocket costs, HSA withdrawals should only be compared to the incurred out-
of-pocket payments. When HSA assets are insu cient to cover expenses, then HSA
withdrawals should only be compared to available HSA funds. Withdrawals should
28The relationship between HSA and 401(k) funding relates to the long debate on retirement
saving crowd-out and the interest elasticity of saving. Early studies on the introduction of IRAs and
401(k)s such as Engen et al. (1996), Poterba et al. (1996), and Benjamin (2003) reached di erent
conclusions partly because they struggled to isolate exogenous variation in 401(k) contributions
from tastes for saving, as reviewed by Bernheim (2002). The most comprehensive study to date
(Chetty et al. 2014) using Danish tax registry data estimates that 99 cents of every dollar saved
in a tax-preferred account would have been saved in non-taxable accounts, indicating almost full
crowd-out.
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equal M if the MPC equals 1 and should equal 0 if the MPC is 0. I regress the level
of HSA withdrawals on M and observables, which include expected health spending,
salary, the number of dependents, type of coverage, age, sex, and firm tenure. The
point estimate on the coe cient on M is 0.733. I test whether the coe cient estimate
is either 1 or 0, rejecting the null in both cases. If I include employee fixed e ects, I
obtain smaller point estimates but similar results of the hypothesis tests.
1.5.5. Changes in Health Care Spending
This section quantifies the change in health care spending associated with the replace-
ment of traditional insurance coverage with HDHPs and HSAs. Studies of HDHPs
in other settings have tended to find moderate reductions in health care spending in
the range of 10 to 15 percent (Buntin et al. 2011; Borah et al. 2011; Haviland et al.
2015; Brot-Goldberg et al. 2015). By contrast, HDHPs were not linked to a reduc-
tion in health care costs in this sample. As described in Section 4, the traditional
insurance plans o ered before 2008 featured first-dollar coverage, with copayments
for physician services and prescription drugs. Employees paid a deductible for other
services, which were then fully covered after the deductible. Plans di ered only in
the size of this deductible. The switch to HDHPs dropped the first-dollar coverage
on physicians services and prescription drugs, applying a single deductible for all care
(which was also equal to the out-of-pocket (OOP) max, as before).
Table 1.8 presents regressions of the log of total health care spending against an indi-
cator for being enrolled in a HDHP with HSA (corresponding to years 2008 and 2009),
salary, expected health spending, the number of dependents, and employee fixed ef-
fects. Among all employees in the sample, the introduction of HDHPs was associated
with a 6 percent increase as shown in Column 1, which is statistically significant at
the 10 percent level. Columns 2 and 3 compare the sub-sample of employees who
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selected similar coverage levels before and after the introduction of HDHPs, defined
as having a standard deviation in the deductible of less than $250 throughout the
period. The coe cient estimate on the HDHP and HSA indicator is close to zero and
imprecisely estimated. The fourth column restricts the sample to those employees
with the same out-of-pocket maximum before and after HDHPs. Total spending is
estimated to be lower by 5.3 percent after the introduction of HDHPs with HSAs,
but again this estimate is not statistically significant. Replacing traditional coverage
with HDHPs and HSAs was not linked to sizable spending declines in this setting.
1.6. Estimation and Identification of Choice Model
1.6.1. Overview
The choice model is estimated by simulated maximum likelihood. The estimating
algorithm draws parameter values from the assumed distributions of the random co-
e cient (risk aversion), calculates choice probabilities for each sequence of choices
given those parameters, and then matches predicted and observed choices. The stan-
dard model includes risk aversion as the only source of preference heterogeneity. The
HSA model also includes the MPC and allows HSA and 401(k) saving to shift demand
for insurance plans. Both models incorporate the same cost distributions as described
below and construct marginal tax rates using NBER’s TAXSIM calculator.29
29The employee’s salary and state of residence are the two inputs to estimate the marginal tax
rate using NBER’s TAXSIM. Information on salary of spouses and other relevant tax information
is not available. I construct the marginal tax rate for employees with family coverage using the
employee’s salary assuming the taxpayer files as single. This may misestimate the marginal tax
rates for a subset of observations, but the bias is likely not systematic as some employees may be in
higher brackets and some in lower brackets than assigned based on their salary alone.
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1.6.2. Construction of Out-of-Pocket Cost Distributions
This section describes in detail the procedure for constructing distributions of out-of-
pocket costs for each insured family (employee only or the employee and dependents).
It follows similar methods as Handel (2013) and Handel and Kolstad (2015). This
cost model assumes that there is no moral hazard and that each person in the same
risk group holds the same beliefs about his or her ex ante health expenditure risk.
There are four steps to construct the distributions from the inputs of expenditure
claims and the employer’s severity score.
1. Group each insured individual i into risk group z based on age, sex, and health
status
2. For each risk group, construct a Weibull distribution, Gz, that is modified to
allow for the possibility of zero expenditure using observed total health expen-
diture m from the following year
3. For each person in risk group z, simulate expenditure draws from Gz and add
up the draws within each family k to create an ex ante distribution of total
health expenditure risk Gk for family k
4. For each family k, map the distribution of expenditure risk Gk to out-of-pocket
costs under deductible j to create a family-specific ex ante distribution of out-
of-pocket costs Fjk of choosing deductible j
Each individual i is first categorized into risk group z based on their age, sex, and
quintile of the severity score. The age bins used are 0-14, 15-24, 25-34, 45-64, 65 and
older. The severity score, which is recorded on each insurance claim, measures the
expected health spending for that enrollee using a proprietary formula constructed by
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the company. The score is not used for payment purposes, but rather represents the
employer’s actuarial forecast about that person’s expenditure risk. I use the severity
score captured on the last claim before the start of the plan year as a measure of
health status during the open enrollment period. For each age bin and each sex,
I classify individuals into quintiles of the severity score within that age-sex cell. I
pool years 2007 through 2009 together to ensure adequate sample sizes. This process
results in 60 risk groups based on six age bins, sex, and quintiles of severity score.
After the risk groups are defined, the observed expenditures for each person in the
group the following year are used to estimate an ex ante expenditure distribution
for that group. Denote the empirical distribution of claims the following year by
‚GIz . In constructing this distribution, expenditures on preventive care are excluded
since such services are covered free of charge by all plans. Only claims from in-
network providers are considered, which comprise over 95 percent of all spending. I
continuously fit this empirical distribution using a Weibull distribution with a mass
of claims at zero to generate an ex ante distribution of expenditure risk, consistent
with prior work (Handel 2013; Kolstad and Handel 2015).
The creation of this ex ante distribution of expenditure by risk group involves two
steps to deal with the mass of expenditure at zero. First, for each risk group k, the
empirical probability of zero expenditure is used to construct the mass of expenditure
realizations at zero, denoted ‚GIz(0). Second, a Weibull distribution is fitted to the
observed expenditures that are positive in that risk group by maximizing the following














Denote „–z and „—z as the estimated parameters and W 1„–z,„—z2 as the distribution of
positive expenditure in risk group z. The (ex ante) distribution for expenditure in
risk group z is then:
Gz =
Y___]___[
‚GIz(0) if m = 0
‚GIz(0) + W( ‚–z , ‚—z)1≠‚GIz (0) if m > 0
For each insured individual within each risk group, 100 draws are simulated from
the corresponding expenditure distribution Gz. Then within each family k, the ex-
penditures for each draw from each member are summed, so that each family has
100 draws corresponding to the family’s total expenditure. This statistical object,
denoted Gk, represents the beliefs of family k about its total health expenditure risk.
Since families di er in their compositions by age, sex, severity score, and size, this
classification by risk group results in over 2,500 di erent combinations of expected
spending in the sample.
Each family’s out-of-pocket cost distribution in plan j, denoted Fjk, is calculated by
applying each expenditure draw from distribution Gk to the insurance deductible Dj.
Since there is no coinsurance beyond the deductible, out-of-pocket costs equal total
health expenditure if expenditure is below the deductible and equal the deductible
if expenditure exceeds the deductible. There is a single deductible for both medical
and pharmacy claims so the out-of-pocket mapping between total expenditure and
costs is particularly simple in this setting. The mapping is thus defined as:
OOP =
Y___]___[
m if m Æ Dj
Dj if m > Dj
The family-specific distribution of out-of-pocket costs Fjk under each deductible is
then used as input into the model of insurance and saving choices.
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1.6.3. Specification
Observing 401(k) saving allows me to estimate the model’s parameters without esti-
mating a fully structural life-cycle model of savings. I assume any unobservables—
such as beliefs about income processes or bequest motives—and preferences for future
consumption operate equivalently between the HSAs and 401(k)s given the nearly
identical structure and rules between the two savings vehicles. Importantly, this ap-
proach does not require assumptions about the optimality of 401(k) saving, which
may be violated in practice (Choi et al. 2011).
Risk aversion, which is assumed to be time-invariant, is modeled as a random coe -








The mean is specified to be linearly related to employee age, income, job character-
istics, and coverage type as:
µ“ = –“ + —age“ AGE ++—sal“ SALARY + —fin“ FINANCE
+—tenure“ TENURE + —self“ SELF (1.9)
where employee age is specified in 2008, salary is averaged between 2008 and 2009,30
FINANCE is an indicator for whether the employee’s job classification relates has a
label of Finance/Accounting, Actuarial, or Underwriting, TENURE is an indicator
for working at the firm at least 6 years, and SELF is an indicator for self-coverage.
30The specification of CARA utility assumes no income e ects, so including salary is intended to
pick up the influence of variables correlated with salary, rather than the role of income per se.
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Consumption for family k in plan j in year t in the standard model is:
xjkt = (yk ≠ ﬁjt) (1≠ ·kt)≠OOPjkt + ‘jkt (1.10)
where ‘jkt denotes a normally distributed family-plan-time-specific error that is iid
for each plan. The standard deviation of the errors, denoted ‡‘j (Ck), is allowed
to vary between self and family coverage, indexed by Ck for family k. This error
rationalizes choices not predicted given the candidate preference parameters, ex ante
health care costs, and other observables. Conceptually, the error may represent errors
in forecasting health care costs. The variance of the shock on the lowest deductible
plan in each year is normalized to 1.
In the HSA model, the MPC is modeled as a linear function of the same characteristics
as:
÷ = –÷+—age÷ AGE+—sal÷ SALARY +—fin÷ FINANCE+—tenure÷ TENURE+—self÷ SELF
(1.11)
The coe cient estimates in the above equation provide information about the poten-
tial mechanisms behind using the HSA for short-term costs. For example, a negative
sign on —ˆage÷ would support discounting, because older employees—who have to wait
fewer years until HSA funds become unrestricted—would then use HSAs more for
future consumption compared to younger employees. Income and job type provide
indirect evidence regarding financial literacy, with negative coe cient estimates on
those variables supporting that mechanism.
The estimation of the HSA model adds three terms to the standard model as shown
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in equation below. Consumption in the standard model is represented in the first line.
The term in the second line captures the HSA withdrawal to finance a given OOP
payment as a function of the MPC ÷, employee contributions h, employer matching
rates m and limits L, and beginning-year HSA balances H. This term captures the
interaction between current out-of-pocket risk and HSA funding. The third line incor-
porates HSA and 401(k) saving as demand shifters for plan choices. Conditional on
401(k) saving, if HSA saving does not di er across plans, then ‚÷ = 0. If ÷ > 0, then
HSA saving is chosen partly to o set current out-of-pocket expenditure. In the case
where ÷ = 1, HSA saving fully represents a price reduction for current out-of-pocket
payments.
x˜jkt = (yk ≠ ﬁjt ≠ hkt) (1≠ ·kt)≠OOPjkt
+min {OOPjkt, ÷ (Hkt +min [hkt(1 +mkt), hkt +mktLkt])}
+ (1≠ ÷)ÿ
jœJ
hktI (d = j) +
ÿ
jœJ
Ÿjt401(k)ktI (d = j) + Â‘jkt (1.12)
Including HSA and 401(k) saving as demand-shifters is a reduced-form approach to
estimate the MPC and risk aversion. The specification, motivated by theory, con-
strains ÷ to lie between 0 and 1 and estimates ÷ by running a horse race between
401(k) saving—capturing saving for future consumption—and HSA balances, match-
ing rates, and interactions with out-of-pocket payments—capturing saving for current
health care costs. A more structural approach would model the continuous choice
of HSA saving simultaneously with the discrete choice of insurance deductible in a
framework similar to Dubin and McFadden (1984). That formulation would increase
the choice set each year from J to JQ, where Q is the number of possible HSA con-
tributions. This increase in dimensionality raises the computational requirements
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for the estimation substantially even with discretizing the set of HSA contributions
into larger bins. In Section 7, I perform a calibration as a robustness check that
simultaneously models the joint decision of deductible and saving choices. Without
an error term, the parameter estimates can be recovered person by person given the
richness of the data variation. That exercise yields results qualitatively similar to the
choice model here, providing support to the reduced-form approach to model HSA
and insurance choices.
The probability of household k choosing plan j in year t for simulation s, with ex-
pected utility denoted Vjkts, is calculated using a smoothed accept-reject function
with a modified logit transformation (Train 2009).31 Compared to an accept-reject
simulator, this transformation accommodates the case where a small change in pa-
rameters does not translate into a change in the discrete choice of plan as well as the
case where some observed choices are never optimal. Let ◊ denote the parameters
of the model to be estimated: ◊ ©
1
µ“,‡2“,–, —, µ÷,‡‘j (Ck)
2
. Given candidate pa-
rameters ◊, the smoothed accepted-reject simulator specifies the choice probability of
family k choosing plan j in year t in simulation s as:


















. The parameter Ÿ is a scale factor used to
approximate the indicator function of the accept-reject simulator without introducing
numerical di culties.32
31The logit transformation of the accept-reject simulator was suggested by McFadden (1989). I
follow Handel (2013) in taking the reciprocal of the expected utilities, normalized by the utility of
one plan, because CARA utility is negative and already exponential.
32I use Ÿ=6 in calculating choices and verify the estimates are not sensitive to the choice of
smoothing parameter.
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Pr(j = jú|◊)kts (1.14)
With four plan choices and two years, there are 16 possible choice sequences in the
standard model where the only discrete choices is the deductible. Denote the set of all
sequences of choices as W = JT , where T=2 with two years of data. The simulated







dkw ln (Pk (◊)) (1.15)
where dkw is an indicator function for whether family k chose sequence w. The esti-
mating algorithm uses interior point methods to select the value of ◊ that maximizes
SLL(◊).
1.6.4. Identification
In the standard model, the choice of deductible identifies sets of risk aversion that
maximize expected utility based on the ex ante cost distribution, premiums, and
marginal tax rate. Risk aversion is point identified by making a parametric assump-
tion on its distribution. Identification also assumes that consumers have rational
beliefs about their ex ante cost distribution, which is a standard assumption made
in the literature. In the model with HSA saving, the two preference parameters to
estimate are risk aversion and the MPC. The employer’s introduction of HDHPs,
cross-sectional and time-series variation in deductibles o ered, premiums, matching
rates, and data on 401(k) choices are key to separately identify the parameters. The
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employer’s switch to HDHPs can be viewed as exogenous because the insurer viewed
increased consumer decision-making among its own workforce as a strategy that could
help reduce costs for its clients too. The adoption was therefore not based on a per-
ceived demand from employees for this type of insurance product. From the per-
spective of a single employee, cross-sectional and time-series variation in deductibles,
premiums, and matching rates are also clearly exogenous.
Risk aversion is separately identified from the MPC because some variation shifts
deductible choices but not HSA saving, while other variation shifts HSA saving but
not deductible choices. Premium variation influences the choice of deductible but
not the level of HSA saving, which provides identifying variation in risk aversion
separately from the MPC. Similarly, 401(k) saving a ects the level of HSA contri-
butions for retirement consumption, but does not influence deductible choice. Sav-
ing in 401(k) plans thus helps to identify the MPC separately from risk aversion.
Employer matching rates influence both deductible and saving choices and provides
another source of variation to identify the model’s parameters. Matching rates vary
mostly cross-sectionally, but they also change over time for 9 percent of the sam-
ple. Within-employee changes in HSA balances reflect choices on past contributions
and withdrawals that also provide important information on how HSAs are used.
The necessary assumption for within-employee variation in HSA balances to credibly
identify ÷ and “ is that HSA balances a ect saving and plan choices only through the
expected out-of-pocket risk. Since there is also little option value from HSA saving




This section presents results from the choice model that estimates risk aversion and
the MPC. The results demonstrate the importance of incorporating HSA funding de-
cisions into models of insurance choices with HDHPs. The standard model struggles
to rationalizes these choices with risk aversion as the sole source of preference het-
erogeneity. Table 9, Column 1 presents the estimated parameters from the standard
model. The model estimates a high level of risk aversion—the mean CARA coe -
cient is 1.5 ◊ 10≠3—and also large heterogeneity in risk preferences. The estimated
variances on the random shocks are very large for the highest deductible plan for both
self and family coverage. Such large variances relative to the lowest deductible plan
rationalize the high rates of switching between deductibles from one year to the next.
Observed plan choices are thus rationalized with large enough shocks specific to each
year and plan and highly heterogeneous risk preferences.
Estimates that use HSA and 401(k) contributions as demand shifters is presented in
Column 2 of Table 1.9. Accounting for HSA contributions leads to a lower estimate
of risk aversion, 3.5◊ 10≠4, which is more plausible than the risk aversion estimated
in the standard model. To interpret the magnitude of the risk aversion estimates,
I follow Cohen and Einav (2007) and subsequent work in calculating the amount
Y such that a consumer with the given level of risk aversion would be indi erent
between accepting and rejecting a 50-50 gamble to win $1,000 or lose $Y. In the
standard model, Y equals $383 versus $739 in the HSA model. To express the results
in terms of relative risk aversion (RRA), multiplying by the sample’s median after-
tax salary yields CRRA estimates of 42 and 10, respectively. The point estimates
of risk aversion are statistically di erent between the two models. Including HSAs
substantially improves the model’s fit to the data, as indicated by the Likelihood
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Ratio test statistic which is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. In both
models, risk aversion is still estimated to be highly heterogeneous across consumers
as reflected by the large standard deviation relative to the mean. Larger dispersion in
estimated risk aversion in this setting compared to others may be driven by greater
rates of plan switching.
The MPC is estimated to 0.68, on average, with a 95 percent confidence interval
between 0.65 and 0.72. Higher income employees are more likely to use their HSA
to save for future consumption rather than current medical costs, as indicated by the
negative estimate on the MPC slope coe cient. Older employees are more likely to
use the account for short-term costs, as are employees with self-coverage. Conditional
on these variables, the relationship between the MPC and job characteristics (tenure
or working in a finance-related position) is not statistically significant. I return to
discuss the potential underlying sources of the MPC in Section 1.8.
1.7.1. Robustness: Calibration using HSA withdrawals
Since the HDHPs are di erentiated only by their deductibles and are equivalent across
all other dimensions (e.g. provider networks), it is useful to consider a robustness
test that excludes an error term and does not specify the distribution of risk aversion.
Without a plan- and time-specific shock, the expected utility model is calibrated by
taking advantage of the fact that when used to finance the deductible, HSA saving
o ers a continuous choice of insurance contract that flexibly recovers the distribution
of risk aversion. The level of HSA saving intended for current out-of-pocket payments
and choice of deductible then point-identifies risk aversion for each observation, con-
ditional on its cost distribution and marginal tax rate. I numerically solve for the
level of HSA saving that maximizes expected utility for each observed combination of
cost distribution and marginal tax rate for a given risk aversion level. By performing
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this calculation over a grid of risk aversion from 10≠6 to 5 ◊ 10≠3 in increments of
10≠6, I construct a monotonic mapping from risk aversion to deductible choices, HSA
saving for current out-of-pocket costs, cost distributions, and marginal tax rates.
Once the amount of HSA saving reserved for current out-of-pocket payments is quanti-
fied, applying this mapping recovers each observation’s risk aversion coe cient. I take
the level of observed withdrawals each year as the simplest estimate of the quantity
of HSA saving reserved for short-term costs. The average share of assets withdrawn
each year is 70 percent. On the one hand, this estimate of the MPC will underesti-
mate the level of deductible insurance demanded if a person incurs minimal medical
claims. On the other hand, the MPC would be overestimated if HSA withdrawals
purchase predictable over-the-counter spending, which would not be included in the
cost distributions that are based on insurance claims.33
Table 1.10 presents sample statistics of estimated risk aversion from this calibration.
Median risk aversion is estimated to be 2.4 ◊ 10≠4, slightly lower than the choice
model estimate in Table 9. The correlation coe cient between risk aversion and
MPC is 0.21, The results of this calibration are consistent with the estimates from
the choice model, providing additional support to the finding that HSAs are largely
used to finance short-term health care costs.
1.7.2. Robustness: Estimation of choice model using 1st-year data only
I have argued it is reasonable to use within-employee variation in HSA balances to
identify the parameters and to not model plan choices as a dynamic optimization
problem. As a check on this assumption, I re-estimate the choice model using data
33I obtain quantitatively similar results if I calculate the average withdrawal as a percentage of
assets during the two-year period because most people withdraw similar proportions of HSA funds
each year.
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only from 2008 when beginning-year HSA balances were zero for everyone. Premium
variation still identifies risk aversion separately from the MPC and 401(k) saving
identifies the MPC separately from risk aversion. The MPC is estimated to be 0.76,
which is only slightly larger than the estimates in Table 1.9. This check reinforces
the results, and suggests the parameter estimates are not driven by dynamics omitted
from the model.
1.8. Mechanisms
The MPC summarizes the potential e ect of several economic fundamentals on in-
surance plan choices, including discounting, mental accounting, information frictions,
and financial literacy. This section discusses several of these potential underlying
sources. I first present empirical evidence related to information frictions and liquidity
constraints, which are two mechanisms that the data allow me to partially investigate.
I then discuss how discounting and mental accounting may a ect choices, and how
such fundamentals relate to financial literacy. Understanding the micro-foundations
of these decisions may be important for policy. For example, interventions to encour-
age desirable choices—whether through information, financial incentives, defaults,
etc.—are likely to be more e ective if they are targeted at the relevant part of the de-
cision process. I find that employees are well-informed about many parts of insurance
coverage, including coverage of preventive care, the tax benefits of HSA saving, and
the ability of HSA assets to roll over each year. The data do not allow me to study
whether employees understand the fungibility of HSA assets as cash in retirement,
however, which is arguably the least well known feature of HSAs. I do find suggestive
evidence that liquidity constraints partly explain choices. In particular, the inability
to finance the entire deductible may lead employees to choose lower deductibles than
they would otherwise prefer.
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1.8.1. Information frictions
In addition to the fact that the company is a health insurer, several pieces of empirical
evidence point to the company’s employees being more knowledgable about health
insurance products than the average consumer. First, employees choose dominated
plans less often than has been documented elsewhere. In 2007, before the mandatory
switch to HDHP coverage, the lowest deductible plan was dominated by higher de-
ductible plans for family coverage. More specifically, to reduce the deductible from
$4,000 to $2,500 cost over $1,500 in higher premiums. For any level or type of spend-
ing, a family would therefore pay more if enrolled in the lowest deductible plan than
plans with higher deductibles. The lowest deductible plan was not dominated for
plans covering an employee only, employee plus spouse, or employee plus one child.
The plan shares by coverage type reflects these price di erences: the lowest deductible
was chosen by 17 percent of consumers with employee-only coverage, employee plus
child coverage, and employee plus spouse coverage (where it was not dominated),
while it was chosen by only 11 percent with family coverage.34 By contrast, a re-
cent study where employees of a large firm could customize their plan design found
that 55 percent selected dominated plans (Bhargava, Loewenstein, and Sydnor 2015),
considerably more than this setting.
Second, HSA saving is lower in states that do not exempt contributions from state
income taxes, consistent with employees being knowledgeable about HSA tax ben-
efits. A handful of States—Alabama, California, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and
Wisconsin—did not exempt HSA funds from state income taxes during this period.
34It is worth noting that depending on a family’s marginal tax rate, this plan may not be dominated
because premium payments are tax exempt while out-of-pocket payments are not. This comparison
can then be interpreted as reflecting worse terms of trade for the lowest deductible plan relative to
other deductibles for families, but not for other coverage types. Regardless, this comparison of plan
shares provides indirect evidence that employees respond to prices in insurance plan choices.
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According to the employer, there were even complaints by employees working in these
states because they did not receive the same tax benefits. Conditional on observables,
the level of annual HSA saving is 7 percent lower in these states compared to those
that exempt HSA funds from state income tax. This di erence is statistically signifi-
cant and roughly in line with state-level income tax rates, providing further evidence
that employees are aware of the tax benefits from HSA funds.
Third, employees appear to understand that HSA funds do not expire at year’s end
because withdrawals do not spike during the final months of coverage. If employees
believed that HSA funds did not roll over (as with FSAs), then HSA assets should
be exhausted at the end of each year and one would expect to see higher withdrawals
at the end of the year. This pattern is not observed in the data. Withdrawals are
actually smallest at the end of year, and this is not due to HSA balances being lower:
the share of HSA assets withdrawn is also lower in later months than earlier months.
These patterns provide suggest that employees understand that unused HSA funds
roll over.
Fourth, preventive care—which is exempt from the deductible—does not decline af-
ter the adoption of HDHPs, suggesting employees are knowledgable about HDHP
benefits. There is no decline in the number of preventive visits, total spending on
preventive care, or the number of screening mammographies after enrolling in an
HDHP. In fact, the averages all increase slightly. This behavior contrasts with re-
search from other settings documenting that consumers were unaware that preventive
care was covered in HDHPs and many cut back on preventive care once enrolled in a
HDHP (Reed et al. 2012; Brot-Goldberg et al. 2015).
Finally, HSA saving does not vary systematically by firm tenure or date of firm exit,
which suggests unobserved information may not be important. For example, employ-
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ees planning to leave the firm soon after the HSA program began may have rationally
chosen to contribute less to their HSA if they were uncertain of HSA availability at
a future employer. It is reasonable to believe that longer firm tenure is associated
with being more informed, conditional on salary, age, and other factors. Compared to
employees with two or more years of firm tenure, employees with 1 year of tenure have
lower than average levels of HSA saving for self coverage, but not for family coverage.
Those who have worked at the firm the longest tend to make higher than average
HSA contributions, conditional on income and other observables, but the di erences
are small in magnitude.
1.8.2. Liquidity constraints
This section evaluates whether liquidity (or cash) constraints, which are unobserved
and outside of my model, may explain plan and saving choices in this setting. Choos-
ing an insurance plan entails a financial trade-o  between the upfront cost of the in-
surance premium and the out-of-pocket costs from utilization. Cash constraints may
prevent people from purchasing the plan they want because of either high premiums
(for plans with lower deductibles) or high out-of-pocket costs (for plans with higher
deductibles). I study cash constraints in two ways. First, I model plan choices when
employees face a fixed budget for premiums and out-of-pocket payments, and analyze
how plan choices change as this budget is relaxed.35 Second, I compare observed plan
choices and saving decisions for employees who take loans from their 401(k)—roughly
one-third of the sample—to those who do not. Research on retirement saving finds
that those with 401(k) loans are more likely to be liquidity constrained compared to
35In this setting, either the lowest deductible or highest deductible always is the lowest cost, on
average, at any given level of spending as shown previously in Figure 3.1. Of course, once risk
aversion is introduced, the least expensive plan is no longer necessarily optimal because of curvature
in the utility function.
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those without a loan (Lu and Mitchell 2010).36 The analysis suggests liquidity con-
straints may influence plan choices and HSA saving in this setting, but this mechanism
only explains a small portion of the empirical patterns.
First consider plan choices when consumers have a fixed amount of money to spend on
premiums and out-of-pocket payments. Depending on the size of the cash constraint,
the most preferred plan may not be a ordable and so a di erent plan is chosen
instead (“the constrained plan choice”). The data does not allow me to observe
the size of any employee’s cash constraint. To investigate the potential importance
of such constraints in plan choice, this exercise compares how di erent constrained
plan choices are likely to be from unconstrained plan choices. If the two choices
are not di erent, then omitting liquidity constraints from the plan choice model is
likely not problematic. I consider two statistics of out-of-pocket costs when defining
cash constraints. First, a plan is una ordable if the sum of premiums and expected
out-of-pockets exceeds the cash constraint. The second definition bases a ordability
on the sum of premiums and the maximum out-of-pocket realization from the cost
distribution (which is always the deductible because the distribution is continuous).
One could make arguments for using either definition, but requiring the employee to
be able to finance whatever spending draw occurs, rather than just the expectation of
costs, seems to come closer to news reports about HDHP a ordability and consumer
decisions (Pear 2015).
Figure 4.1 presents an area plot of the regions for which each deductible choice is
optimal, given the constraint that out-of-pocket payments and premiums must not
exceed the specified cash constraint for health care. As one moves right along the
horizontal axis, the cash constraint is relaxed, and as one moves up on the vertical
36The authors use income and non-retirement financial wealth to judge liquidity constraints among
2.3 million Vanguard account holders across nearly 1,000 employers.
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axis, risk aversion is increased. I consider women aged 35 to 44 in the median quin-
tile of severity score, representing an intermediate level of spending.37 When cash
constraints are based on premiums and expected out-of-pocket costs (the top panel),
the expected cost di erences between plans are small, represented by the distance
between points A and B. At a risk aversion level of 6 ◊ 10≠4, the employee would
prefer to choose the $1,250 deductible if she were not cash constrained. However,
that plan has the highest premiums and expected out-of-pocket payments, and so
if her budget were below $2,390, the plan would be una ordable. As the cash con-
straint is tightened (moving to the left horizontally), she would choose a plan with
a higher deductible. If her budget for health care were below $2,288—the premium
and expected out-of-pocket payment of the lowest deductible plan—then she will not
purchase coverage at all (and will not appear in my sample). Since the range between
these two points is only about $100, liquidity constraints are unlikely to explain plan
choices when consumers budget for average out-of-pocket payments.
Liquidity constraints are more likely to distort plan choices if cash constraints are
based on the sum of premiums and the deductible (bottom panel). Now at low levels
of risk aversion, employees who are unable to finance the entire deductible in case of
large health expenses would choose a plan that o ers a lower deductible in return for
a higher premium. The range over which cash constraints would lead people to make
a di erent plan choice is now larger, equal to $946 and again represented between
points A and B. In this case, ignoring liquidity constraints may overestimate risk
aversion: for a given cost distribution, the model judges a person choosing a low
deductible to be more risk averse than if that person chose a high deductible, when
this choice may instead reflect liquidity constraints.38 The reverse was true in the
37I find similar patterns for other cost distributions as well.
38The e ect of not modeling liquidity constraints on risk aversion here is similar to how ignoring
adjustment costs can attenuate microeconomic elasticities of labor supply (Chetty et al. 2011).
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previous case shown in the top panel. These graphs are hypothetical, but illustrative
of the ways that budget constraints might influence plan choices.
I now turn to an empirical analysis that compares observed plan choices and HSA
saving between employees who took out a 401(k) loans and other employees who did
not. One-third of employees take at least one loan from their 401(k) between 2008 and
2009, with 14 percent taking one loan and 18 percent taking two loans. Employees
with family coverage are more likely to take a loan than employees with self coverage.
Similar to (Lu and Mitchell, 2010), higher-salaried employees are less likely to take
loans, but have higher loan balances conditional on taking one. Table 1.11 shows that
employees who take 401(k) loans during this period choose lower deductibles, make
lower HSA contributions, and withdraw a larger share of HSA assets than employ-
ees without loans. Panel A shows the percentage of employees choosing the lowest
deductible is over 5 percentage points higher among those with loans than those
without loans. This share is higher among employees with self coverage. The high-
est deductible is chosen less often among those with loans compared to those without
loans. These plan choices are consistent with the patterns illustrated in Figure 4.1(b),
in which those facing tighter liquidity constraints choose lower deductibles than they
otherwise would. Panel B of Table 1.10 shows that the means of deductibles, saving,
and salaries are all lower among employees with loans, and the di erences are statis-
tically significant. These comparisons provide evidence that plan choices and saving
rates are likely influenced by liquidity constraints, at least partly. Yet several pieces
of the data also suggests this mechanism plays a small role: (1) the same general pat-
terns in plan choices are observed for those without loans, as the lowest deductible is
most popular followed by the highest deductible; (2) the magnitude of the di erences
in HSA contributions are fairly modest: $164 for employee contributions and just $65
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for total contributions; (3) HSA disbursements are still large among those without
loans, with 67 percent of assets withdrawn annually.
1.8.3. Discounting, mental accounting, and financial literacy
A natural explanation for HSA saving patterns may be discounting. If people have
strong preferences for current consumption, they may choose to contribute and with-
draw HSA funds to finance current health care costs even though they recognize their
future consumption demands. Models of present-biased preferences (Laibson 1997;
O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999) help to explain the demand for commitment devices
like 401(k)s for retirement saving (Laibson et al. 1998). And yet even the 401(k)—
clearly intended by policy as a retirement savings vehicle—still gives account holders
ample flexibility for penalty-free withdrawals, known as “leakage” (Beshears et al.
2015; Munnell and Webb 2015). The HSA provides even greater opportunity to draw
down assets while working since most consumers incur positive health expenditures
each year and have a debit card for withdrawals.
Another possible psychological construct explaining saving and plan choices is mental
accounting, which assumes households group income and expenditure items into sep-
arate accounts (Thaler 1985, 1990; Prelec and Loewenstein 1998; Shefrin and Thaler
1988). Households maintain a system of category budgeting similar to how businesses
have di erent accounting units. Mental accounting, which is an example of framing,
assumes that the marginal propensity to consume di ers between various income ac-
counts (e.g. current income, future income, wealth), and that households may also
earmark funds for di erent purposes. The “envelope method” of budgeting—whereby
households allocate cash to di erent physical envelopes for monthly spending on food,
gas, etc.—is an example of such behavior. Such behavior is sub-optimal, since if prices
change, the most preferred consumption bundle may also change. Holding separate
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accounts violates the fungibility of money. Prior research has documented violations
of fungibility for particular expenditure items like gasoline (Hastings and Shapiro
2013), grocery purchases (Milkman and Beshears 2009), restaurant meals (Abeler
and Marklein 2013), and children’s clothing (Kooreman 2000). There is also evidence
that financial borrowing decisions by some consumers violate the no-arbitrage condi-
tion: many take payday loans when lower interest credit is available (Agarwal, Skiba,
and Tobacman 2009) or simultaneously hold both high-interest credit card debt and
low-yield assets (Gross and Souleles 2002). In the context of HSAs, people may view
their HSAs as accounts designated to cover only health care expenses, while their
401(k)s are designed for retirement saving, even though the money is fungible.
Such empirical anomalies may ultimately stem from a gap in financial literacy (Hast-
ings, Madrian, and Skimmyhorn 2013; Lusardi and Mitchell 2014). Financial literacy
includes not only information about financial products but also the mathematical
skills and conceptual knowledge, such as compound interest, required to make so-
phisticated financial decisions. In the case of HDHPs and HSAs, consumers must be
knowledgable about both the features of health insurance contracts and tax-preferred
savings vehicles to make informed decisions. Acquiring such knowledge represents a
tall order for many people. Research in other employment settings suggests many
HDHP policyholders lack knowledge about what their plan covers (Lieu et al. 2010;
Reed et al. 2012) and such information gaps meaningfully impact plan choices (Han-
del and Kolstad 2015). Employees in this setting appear knowledgeable about HDHP
coverage, the tax benefits of HSA saving, and the ability for HSA funds to roll over;
however, it is possible they lack knowledge about the fungibility between HSA and
401(k) accounts, which is arguably the most complex feature of these contracts.
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1.9. Welfare Implications
1.9.1. Changes in health care consumption and moral hazard
The policy objective when introducing HDHPs was for consumers to face the full
cost of care for small expenses, rather than pay a fraction of the total cost with
coinsurance. Yet as we have seen, a positive MPC leads consumers to view their
HSA saving as a price reduction, undermining the cost-control incentives of HDHPs.
This section seeks to approximate the reduction in moral hazard in moving from a
traditional plan with a 20 percent coinsurance rate—a benchmark corresponding to
the status quo—to an HDHP alone or to an HDHP with HSA saving. The ideal
way to measure moral hazard empirically would be to observe whether the quantity
of health care consumed di ers if insurance provides a lump-sum cash payment or
covers the full cost of care. No research has ever run that experiment. Instead,
my approach to measuring moral hazard is based on the extent to which consumers
choose HSA saving as though the account were cash (i.e. like a 401(k)). The choice
of HSA saving is thus similar to plan selection based on anticipated responses to
the out-of-pocket price, known as “selection on moral hazard” (Einav et al. 2013).
This approach assumes that consumers recognize the fungibility of HSA assets, but
as discussed earlier in Section 1.8, the data do not allow me to test this, unlike other
potential information frictions.39
39Another approach to studying moral hazard and HSAs would be to examine whether consump-
tion decisions di er based on the structure of the insurance contract. Suppose a person with a $500
deductible in traditional insurance chooses to purchase an MRI costing $1,500, so the person paid
$500 and the insurance plan paid costs of $1,000. Now suppose that person instead is enrolled in a
$1,500 HDHP and had $1,000 in their HSA—requiring an additional $500 for the MRI (ignore the
HSA’s tax benefits for now). If the person uses the $1,000 HSA money to buy the MRI, it suggests
there is no moral hazard. If the person with the HSA does not buy the MRI, it implies the $1,000
of benefits financed from traditional insurance were worth less than $1,000 to the person. I plan to
pursue this analysis in future work using data from before and after HDHPs were introduced in this
setting. The challenge is to find such clean comparisons empirically. The intuition here is similar to
measuring how unemployment durations respond to unemployment benefits for households that are
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Let – œ (0, 1) denote the coinsurance rate—the fraction of the cost paid by the
consumer at the time of service. Figure 6 plots a simple example of the demand for
health care, in which the full price of care is denoted by P ú and the price faced by the
consumer with coinsurance is –P ú. Assuming the demand curve reflects the marginal
benefit of care, there is a welfare loss of area ABC from the consumption of care
worth less than its cost of production. Moving from insurance with a coinsurance
rate of – to an HDHP where – = 1 reduces the quantity of care consumed from Q’
to Q and eliminates the welfare loss.
However, a positive MPC leads to smaller decreases in consumption and moral hazard
than these benchmark reductions. A positive MPC acts as a price reduction, lowering
the full price from P ú to P ú (1≠ ÷). At this price, the quantity of care consumed is
Q”, which exceeds the benchmark quantity Q when consumers face the full cost.
There is an associated welfare loss from moral hazard equal to area ADE at this
level of consumption. As long as 1 ≠ ÷ > –, HDHPs reduce moral hazard relative
to traditional insurance, but the decrease is lower than the benchmark case where
HDHPs fully eliminate moral hazard. The reduction in moral hazard when using
the HSA to finance current costs is equal to the trapezoid BCED in Figure 6 rather
than the full welfare loss ABC. Following other research, these calculations assume
consumers perceive the coinsurance rate as the price of care.40
The economic magnitudes of consumption changes will depend on the price elasticity
liquidity-constrained or not to isolate moral hazard separately from liquidity e ects (Chetty 2008).
Of course, for such behavior to reflect moral hazard, people must understand that HSAs can be used
as future cash.
40The non-linear nature of the insurance contract implies the shadow price of care will depend
on the level of consumption. Rational consumers would consider the expected price paid at the end
of the year, which would be zero for those who have reached their out-of-pocket maximum. Recent
studies document consumers respond instead to the spot price of care based on where they currently
are in the contract’s benefit schedule (Abaluck et al.; Dalton et al.; Brot-Goldberg et al.). In my
sample, 70 percent do not exceed the deductible, suggesting it is reasonable to consider the marginal
price of care equal to one dollar for most people.
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of demand and the previous price of care. If we suppose the price elasticity of demand
is equal to -0.2, as in the RAND Health Insurance Experiment (Manning et al. 1987;
Keeler and Rolph 1988), then moving consumers from a coinsurance rate of 20 percent
to paying the full cost under an HDHP would translate into a 27 percent reduction
in the quantity of care consumed.41,42 By contrast, with an MPC equal to 0.68 the
reduction in health care consumption is 6 percent.43
The reduction in moral hazard when using the HSA to pay for current costs is less than
30 percent as large as the reduction of moral hazard from an HDHP where consumers
perceive the full price of care. Applying a variation of the Harberger deadweight loss
formula also implemented by Pauly (1969) and Feldstein (1973), the moral hazard
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where Á is the price elasticity of demand. Assuming the same elasticity, the moral
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41This calculation abstracts from the issues involved with choosing a single price when confronted
with a non-linear contract (Aaron-Dine et al. 2013). Both for simplicity and comparison to previous
work (e.g. Cogan et al. 2011), I choose the coinsurance rate as the price faced by the consumer.
42This calculation uses the average price of care for the percentage increase in price (arc elasticity),
following Cogan et al. (2011) and others in this literature. Specifically, the 133 percentage price
increase is calculated as (1≠ 0.2)/ (0.5◊ (1 + 0.2)) = 1.33. Multiplying 1.33 by -0.2 yields -0.266.
43This is calculated by again applying the arc elasticity formula to the di erence in the price.
Specifically, ≠0.061 = ≠0.2◊ {(1≠ 0.2)/ (0.5◊ (1 + 0.2))≠ (1≠ 0.32)/ (0.5◊ (1 + 0.32))}.
57
The use of HSA saving to pay for current health care costs makes the HDHP 28 percent
as e ective at reducing moral hazard compared to an HDHP alone.44 In dollar terms,
the HDHP with HSA reduces roughly $125 of moral hazard compared to a 20 percent
coinsurance rate, while an HDHP alone would reduce $450 in moral hazard. Figure
6 plots this calculation for an MPC ranging from 0 to 1, to depict the percentage
reduction in moral hazard relative to a standard 20 percent coinsurance rate.
1.9.2. Consumption smoothing benefits and tax expenditure of HSA contributions
The risk smoothing benefits from using HSAs for additional insurance against the
deductible are small relative to the tax expenditure on HSA contributions. Using the
choice model’s estimates, the risk smoothing benefits are calculated as the di erence in
certainty equivalents between the chosen deductible and HSA contribution versus the
same deductible without an HSA. The mean risk smoothing benefit is estimated to be
$387, which is smaller than the mean tax expenditure of $591 on HSA contributions.
Moreover, this calculation does not incorporate the marginal cost of public funds,
which would further increase the cost of taxation.
1.9.3. Impacts on plan choices
Using the HSA to pay for current costs can induce di erent HDHP choices by allowing
people to use HSA saving to reduce the deductible. Table 1.12 presents the results
of simulating plan choices using the choice model parameter estimates from Table 9
and compares these choices to outcomes assuming consumers do not have an HSA
(so that the MPC is zero by construction). The e ect of such plan choices on premi-
44
If demand becomes less elastic as quantity increases (e.g. if the demand curve were linear), this
calculation will overstate the percentage reduction in moral hazard.
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ums depends on the incremental costs of the risks choosing each plan. As in many
settings, the employer contributes a flat amount to the employee’s premium based on
a percentage of the cost of the highest deductible and sets premiums based on the
average expected total cost among consumers enrolled in each plan. Di erences in the
employee premium between plans is then due to di erences in the incremental cost
of more generous coverage relative to the lowest highest deductible plan. Without
an HSA, the average costs of employees choosing the lowest deductible is predicted
to be $3,283 higher than those choosing the highest deductible for self coverage and
$6,938 higher for family coverage. These incremental di erences are smaller in the
case with HSAs, in which the di erences are $2,107 and $5,546, respectively. Since
the employee pays for incremental costs relative to the highest deductible, premiums
for the lowest deductible would be thus $1,176 less for self coverage and $1,392 for
family coverage with HSAs compared to without. The di erences in incremental costs
are also over $1,000 for the intermediate deductibles in most cases. These patterns
suggest that HSAs, at least in this context, may attenuate any adverse selection in
insurance choices.45 These results are highly context-specific and depend on both the
schedule of premium benefits as well as the preference parameters of this population.
Yet the possibility that HSAs influence premiums by inducing consumer re-sorting
across plans is a potentially important and unintended consequence of these contracts.
1.10. Conclusion
This paper studies the experiences of employees using HSAs at a large firm that
fully replaced its traditional health insurance o erings with HDHPs. The policy
45A complete treatment of selection would entail estimating the slope of the marginal cost curves
(Einav et al. 2010). In future work, I intend to study how HSAs influence selection into insurance
in greater detail, including the case when consumers can choose between traditional insurance and
HDHPs.
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rationale behind HDHPs and HSAs was to make consumers more cost-conscious,
while o ering them a subsidy to finance any form of consumption provided they
are willing to wait until age 65. HSAs were designed to reduce costs through tax-
preferred saving accounts, but the evidence shows that consumers in this setting use
their HSA to reduce their deductible, instead of saving for future consumption. At
the margin, 68 cents of every HSA dollar is allocated toward reducing the deductible.
Such responses to the tax incentives counteract the cost-control incentives of the high
deductible. In this setting, replace traditional coverage with HDHPs produced no
decline in health care spending as employees o set the higher deductibles with HSA
contributions. Using the HSA to finance short-term health care costs also induces
consumers to choose di erent plans than they otherwise would. Such re-sorting across
plans indirectly a ects premiums by changing the health risks across plans, which
represents an important unintended consequence of HSAs. I find that HSAs mitigate
adverse selection in this setting, although the direction and magnitude of any selection
will be context-specific based on the population studied and menus of deductibles and
premiums.
Consumers face a challenging decision-making problem in response to the contract’s
tax incentives. HSAs are complex financial accounts that bridge health insurance
and retirement saving, which are already extremely di cult decisions. Not only do
consumers need financial literacy to make informed insurance and saving choices, but
they must also be patient and recognize the substitutability between health care and
other goods from HSA funds. In principle, consumer learning about the HSA and
HDHPs could lead people to use HSAs as a long-term savings vehicle. An important
qualification about this paper’s results is that the analysis is limited to only the first
two years after HSA adoption. In future work, I plan to study the extent to which
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consumers learn over time about HSAs.
In conclusion, contracts that require sophisticated consumer decision-making may
work well in theory, but may be less e ective and lead to unintended consequences in
practice. Future research should consider how to design health insurance contracts
that achieve their objectives when consumers possibly make optimization errors.
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1.11. Tables & Figures
Table 1: Comparison between 401(k) and HSA features
401(k) HSA
Contributions exempt from income tax x x
Contributions exempt from FICA taxes x
Interest grows tax-deferred x x
Medical care tax free x
Penalty for early withdrawal before 2011 10% 10%
Age when can withdraw penalty-free 5912 65
Annual contribution limit (incl. employer) $53,000 self $3,350 self
/$6,650 family
Note: This table presents the major similarities and di erences between HSAs and 401(k)s. In 2011,
the penalty for early withdrawn from the HSA was raised from 10% to 20%. The IRS rules for
catch-up contributions also di er between accounts. People can contribute an extra $6,000 starting
at age 50 to their 401(k) versus $1,000 starting at age 55 to their HSA.
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Figure 1: HSA saving for short-term health care costs: continuous choice of insurance
contract
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$0 HSA contribution (pre-tax)
$1,000 HSA contribution (pre-tax)
$2,500 HSA contribution (pre-tax)
Note: The solid line represents the benefit schedule for a contract with a $3,000 deductible and full
coverage past the deductible: the consumer pays for all expenses out-of-pocket until total costs reach
$3,000 and the insurance plan pays for all costs beyond this amount. The dashed and dotted lines
represent HSA contributions used to provide coverage against out-of-pocket payments associated
with the deductible. For example, a $2,500 contribution shifts the benefit schedule towards the
horizontal axis, so that the first $2,500 of costs are financed from the HSA contribution with pre-tax
funds, the next $500 of costs are financed with after-tax funds, and all costs beyond $3,000 are paid
by the insurance plan. With HSA contributions, any contract in the shaded area is feasible so that
the choice of contract becomes continuous, in e ect.
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Figure 2: Example: Deductible choices by MPC, HSA balances, and health risk
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Note: These graphs plot the chosen deductible assuming a coe cient of absolute risk aversion of
2.5x10≠4. Panel A uses the distribution of spending for a 35-44 year old female in the highest
quintile of health risk and Panel B uses the distribution of spending for a 35-44 year old female in
the median quintile of health risk. In Panel A, higher levels of the MPC induce high-cost consumers
to choose higher deductibles as HSA balances increase. In Panel B, a positive MPC can induce
consumers with moderate health spending to choose lower deductibles if HSA balances are low, or
higher deductibles if HSA balances are high.
64




























0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
Health spending ($)
1,250 deductible 1,750 deductible
2,300 deductible 3,000 deductible
Self coverage
Note: Benefits are calculated as health spending less premiums and out-of-pocket payments. Out-
of-pocket payments equal health spending below the deductible and zero after the deductible. This
figure presents the benefit schedule for self-coverage. Coverage for employee plus spouse, employee
plus children, and families exhibit similar patterns.
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Table 2: Employer Matching Rates for 401(k) and HSA, 2007-2009
A. 401(k)
Year Salary level Match rate m401k Match limit
(share matched)
2008,
2009 All employees 1 on 1% of salary 6.5% salary
then 0.5 after
B. HSA
Year Salary level Match rate mHSA Match limit
(share matched) (self / family)
2008
< $50,000 6 $600 / $1,200
$50,000 - $99,999 4 $400 / $800
$100,000 - $149,999 2 $200 / $400
Ø$150,000 0 $0 / $0
2009
< $50,000 6 $600 / $1,200
$50,000 - $99,999 4 $400 / $800
$100,000 - $149,999 0 $0 / $0
Ø$150,000 0 $0 / $0
Note: This table presents the employer’s matching schedule for employee 401(k) and HSA contri-
butions/ The match rate is defined as the share of the employee’s contribution that is matched by
the employer. A match rate of 2, for example, denotes that the employer contributes $2 for each $1
contributed by the employee. All employees received the same match rate on 401(k) contributions
up to 6.5% of salary. By contrast, employees with lower salaries receive a higher match rate and
match limit on HSA contributions than employees with higher salaries.
66





mean s.d. mean mean
HSA employee contribution ($) 1,141.0 1,095.9 766.9 1,475.4
HSA employer contribution ($) 735.7 349.6 512.9 934.9
HSA balance ($) 318.9 661.6 262.5 369.3
HSA withdrawal ($) 1,495.0 1,098.4 953.9 1,978.7
401(k) employee contribution ($) 3,271.9 3,639.6 2,936.5 3,571.7
401(k) employer contribution ($) 1,556.9 1,366.4 1,388.6 1,707.3
401(k) balance ($) 29,045.8 64,197.0 22,290.8 35,077.7
Deductible ($) 3,068.4 1,520.8 2,028.9 3,997.6
Expected health spending ($) 6,302.0 5,669.4 3,961.1 8,394.6
Salary ($) 54,517.9 34,211.4 49,053.7 59,402.4
Tenure (years) 6.4 5.6 5.97 6.77
Age (years) 39.45 9.9 38.33 40.45
% female 71.3 0.5 73.3 69.5
% married 51.2 0.5 29.8 70.2
% White 66.6 0.5 65.7 67.5
Number of dependents 1.09 1.3 0.0 2.1
% executive/upper 6.0 0.2 3.3 8.5
% manager 29.2 0.5 28.6 29.8
% support sta  28.5 0.5 29.8 27.4
% technician 36.2 0.5 38.3 34.4
% zero HSA contribution 0.8 0.1 0.9 0.7
% obtaining full employer HSA match 96.6 0.2 96.7 96.5
% contributing HSA maximum 3.0 0.2 3.4 2.6
% zero 401(k) contribution 5.7 0.2 5.7 5.8
% obtaining full employer 401(k) match 43.2 0.5 44.8 41.8
% contributing 401(k) maximum 1.9 0.1 0.9 2.7
Note: This table presents means and standard deviations of the analysis sample by type of coverage.
Family coverage also includes coverage for employee plus spouse and employee plus children. 1
percent of households switch between self coverage and family coverage over the two-year period.
The statistics on HSA balances presented in this table are averaged over 2008 and 2009, although
the beginning-year HSA balance was zero for all observations in 2008 because that was the year
employees established their accounts.
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Table 4: Premiums, Deductibles, and Enrollment for Health Plans, 2008-2009






($) ($) (% total) ($) ($) (% total)
A. 2008
HDHP 1,250 1,504 43.7 HDHP 2,500 3,580 42.8
HDHP 1,750 1,228 12.6 HDHP 3,500 2,728 12.9
HDHP 2,300 964 12.4 HDHP 4,600 1,912 17.4
HDHP 3,000 700 31.4 HDHP 6,000 1,084 26.8
B. 2009
HDHP 1,350 1,669 45.1 HDHP 2,700 3,911 44.5
HDHP 1,850 1,376 11.5 HDHP 3,700 2,975 14.4
HDHP 2,400 1,102 10.6 HDHP 4,800 2,097 12.5
HDHP 3,000 836 32.9 HDHP 6,000 1,246 28.6
Note: This table displays the premiums for each deductible o ered in 2008 and 2009 and corre-
sponding enrollment. For visual clarity, premiums for employee plus spouse coverage and employee
plus children coverage are not presented, but are included in all analyses.
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Table 5: Fixed e ects regressions of employee saving
Dependent variable: Dependent variable:
Employee HSA saving Employee 401(k) saving
Levels Levels Log-Log Levels Log-Log
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
HSA balance at -0.307*** -0.055*** 0.200*** 0.089***
beginning of year (-12.01) (-3.68) (4.09) (5.12)
Deductible 0.038 -0.159* 0.001 -0.035
(1.84) (-2.06) (0.02) (-0.35)
Expected OOP less 0.213***
HSA balance (10.39)
Employee HSA 0.073 0.085**
saving (1.39) (2.60)
Employee 401(k) 0.022 0.012 0.038**
saving (1.37) (0.64) (2.63)
401(k) balance at -0.001 -0.001 -0.024* -0.002 0.017
beginning of year (-1.19) (-0.37) (-2.23) (-1.67) (1.33)
Price per HSA -393.35 -611.73 0.18 2209.24** -0.59
dollar, 11+mHSA (-1.23) (-1.90) (0.96) (2.51) (-1.51)
HSA match limit -2.899* -3.622* 0.035 8.483** -0.147
(-2.09) (-2.57) (0.74) (2.52) (-1.76)
401(k) match limit -0.017 -0.011 0.299 0.497** 0.765***
(-0.62) (-0.37) (1.54) (2.69) (4.20)
Employee fixed e ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed e ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 8,873 8,873 8,864 8,873 8,864
R-squared 0.131 0.090 0.041 0.109 0.054
Note: All regressions also include expected health spending, cubics in age, salary, and tenure, the




Table 6: Plan choice regressions
Fixed e ects logit: Ordered logit:
Dep. variable = 1 if given Dep. variable equals
deductible chosen, 0 otherwise deductible chosen











Variables in $100s (1) (2) (3) (4)
HSA balance at beginning 0.969* 1.037** 0.024*** 0.016**
of year (-2.36) (2.78) (3.15) (3.31)
HSA saving 0.982 1.013 -0.030*** -0.003
(Employee + Employer) (-1.86) (1.31) (-3.79) (-0.69)
401(k) balance at 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000*
beginning of year (0.60) (-0.90) (0.32) (2.12)
401(k) saving 1.009 0.996 0.002 0.001
(Employee + Employer) (1.60) (-0.89) (1.07) (0.79)
Expected health spending 1.008*** 0.992*** -0.027*** -0.013***
(4.03) (-3.03) (-13.26) (-15.53)
Employee fixed e ects Yes Yes No No
Year fixed e ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1,252 1,088 2,248 2,532
Log-likelihood -430.3 -383.1 -2,415.9 -2,940.2
Note: Columns 1 and 2 present the results of fixed e ects logits of choosing either for the lowest
deductible (Column 1) or the highest deductible (Column2). These regressions use within-employee
variation and only include employees who switch to or from the lowest or highest deductible choices.
A hazard ratio lower than 1 indicates a lower propensity to choose either the lowest deductible
or highest deductible, while a hazard ratio exceeding 1indicates a greater propensity. Columns 3
and 4 present ordered logits that use between-employee variation in deductible, HSA balances, and
other observables. Regressions also include cubics in age, salary, and tenure. Ordered logits include
indicators for white and marital status. Both sets of regressions indicate that higher HSA balances
are positively correlated with higher deductible choices. Robust t-statistics clustered by employee
in parentheses.*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.
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Table 7: Predicted Probabilities of Deductible Choice from Ordered Logit
A. Self coverage
If HSA balance at Probability chosen deductible equals:
beginning of year equals $1,350 $1,850 $2,400 $3,000
$0 49.4 14.2 11.6 24.8
[46.3, 52.4] [12.6, 15.8] [10.2, 13.1] [22.4, 27.2]
Median ($288) 47.7 14.4 11.9 26.0
[45.1, 50.3] [12.7, 16.0] [10.5, 13.3] [23.9, 28.3]
Mean ($476) 46.4 14.4 12.1 27.0
[44.0, 48.9] [12.8, 16.1] [10.6,13.6] [24.9, 29.2]
75th percentile ($676) 45.3 14.5 12.3 27.9
[42.7, 47.9] [12.8, 16.1] [10.8, 13.8] [25.6, 30.2]
95th percentile ($1,587) 39.7 14.4 13.1 32.8
[34.9, 44.5] [12.8, 16.1] [11.5, 14.7] [28.2, 37.4]
B. Family coverage
If HSA balance at Probability chosen deductible equals:
beginning of year equals $2,700 $3,700 $4,800 $6,000
$0 48.3 16.7 12.7 22.3
[45.5, 51.0] [15.1, 18.3] [11.3, 14.1] [20.1, 24.5]
Median ($325) 46.9 16.8 13.0 23.2
[44.6, 49.3] [15.2, 18.4] [11.6, 14.3] [21.3, 25.2]
Mean ($683) 45.5 16.9 13.3 24.3
[43.3, 47.6] [15.3, 18.5] [11.9, 14.6] [22.4, 26.2]
75th percentile ($990) 44.2 17.0 13.5 25.3
[41.9, 46.5] [15.4, 18.6] [12.1, 14.9] [23.3, 27.3]
95th percentile ($2,397) 38.6 17.0 14.5 29.9
[34.2, 43.1] [15.4, 18.6] [12.9, 16.2] [25.9, 33.9]
Note: This table presents the predicted probabilities of choosing each deductible in 2009 for di erent
levels of the beginning-year HSA balance using the coe cient estimates from the ordered logit model
presented in Table 1.6. The probabilities are calculated holding all other variables at their mean. 95
percent confidence intervals of the predictions are displayed in parentheses. For both self and family
coverage, higher balances predict higher deductible choices, all else equal.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
HDHP and HSA 0.060* 0.018 -0.037 -0.053
(1=yes, 0=no) (0.032) (0.074) (0.078) (0.095)
Salary measured in: Deciles Deciles Logs Deciles
Expected health spending Deciles Deciles Logs Deciles
measured in:
Employee fixed e ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N (household-years) 14,464 4,795 4,795 3,152
Note: Regressions also include number of dependents and a constant. Robust standard errors
clustered by employees in parentheses. *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.
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Risk aversion mean µ“ 1.5◊ 10≠3 3.5◊ 10≠4†
Gamble interpretation $383 $739†
Risk aversion - intercept –“ 1.0◊ 10≠6 4.8◊ 10≠9
Risk aversion - age (years) slope —age“ 3.8◊ 10≠6** 2.5◊ 10≠6**
Risk aversion - salary ($1,000s) slope —sal“ ≠3.0◊ 10≠5 ≠2.1◊ 10≠6**
Risk aversion - indicator for high tenure —tenure“ 4.1◊ 10≠6** ≠1.8◊ 10≠4
Risk aversion - indicator for finance job —fin“ ≠4.1◊ 10≠6** ≠2.5◊ 10≠5
Risk aversion - indicator for self coverage —self“ 2.8◊ 10≠4 5.1◊ 10≠5**
Risk aversion std. deviation ‡“ 3.6◊ 10≠3 7.6◊ 10≠4
MPC mean ÷ 0.68**
MPC 95 % CI [0.65, 0.72]
MPC intercept –÷ 9.5◊ 10≠2
MPC - age (years) slope —age÷ 1.4◊ 10≠2**
MPC - salary ($1,000s) slope —sal÷ -1.2◊ 10≠3
MPC - indicator for high tenure —tenure“ 1.2◊ 10≠2
MPC - indicator for finance job —fin÷ 8.6◊ 10≠3
MPC - indicator for self coverage —self÷ 1.6◊ 10≠1**
‡‘1750 self-only coverage 54.57 127.32
‡‘2300 self-only coverage 10.35 151.73
‡‘3000 self-only coverage 527.03 6.64
‡‘1750 family coverage 141.89 218.65
‡‘2300 family coverage 42.18 78.99
‡‘3000 family coverage 734.97 10.52
401(k) saving No Yes
Likelihood ratio test stat. versus (1) 310.2
Note: This table presents results from the choice model estimated via simulated maximum likelihood.
Column 1 presents estimates from the standard model that does not include HSA saving. Column
2 presents estimates from the model that includes HSA and 401(k) saving to estimate the MPC
in addition to risk aversion. In both columns, the row labeled Gamble Interpretation displays the
amount Y such that a consumer with the given level of risk aversion would be indi erent between
accepting and rejecting a 50-50 gamble of winning $1,000 and losing Y . Standard errors calculated
by bootstrapping. ** denotes 95 percent confidence interval excludes zero.
† denotes point estimate is statistically di erent from same parameter in column 1 at 5 percent level.
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Figure 4: Deductible choices by risk aversion and liquidity constraints, self coverage
in 2008











































































Note: These figures display predicted deductible choices for di erent levels of risk aversion and the
cash constraint for health care using the cost distribution of a female aged 35-44 with the median level
of health care costs. Figure (a) defines cash constraints as the sum of premiums and expected out-
of-pocket payments. Figure (b) defines cash constraints as the sum of premiums and the deductible.
In both graphs, the points A and B denote the range over which cash constraints may distort plan
choices. If the budget for health care is below point A, no insurance plan can be purchased. If the
budget for health care is larger than point B, plan choices only di er by risk preferences. Between A
and B, the employee may not be able to purchase their preferred plan due to their cash constraint.
This window is quite narrow (equal to $101) if the cash constraint is defined based on the sum of
premiums and expected out-of-pocket payments, since these di er only slightly between plans. The
window is wider (equal to $946) if consumers must be prepared to finance the entire deductible,
as shown in Figure (b). In that case, consumers may choose lower deductibles not because of risk
aversion but because of liquidity constraints.
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Figure 5: The quantity of health care demanded when using HSA saving as a price
reduction
                                    
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   















Note: This figure depicts the change in quantity of health care demanded in response to changes in
price. When the the marginal propensity to consume from HSA assets, defined as ÷, is greater than
0, then HSA saving functions as a price reduction on current health care costs. If the consumer pays
the full cost of care at price P* , in which there is zero moral hazard, then the quantity demanded
is Q. A traditional insurance plan charges a coinsurance rate – œ (0, 1), which induces consumption
at the level of Q’ . At this level of consumption, the welfare loss from moral hazard is equal to
area ABC assuming the demand curve reflects the marginal benefits from care. If an HDHP/HSA
contract were to eliminate moral hazard, consumption would decrease from Q’ to Q. However,
using the HSA to reduce current health care costs reduces the price under an HDHP/HSA contract
from P* to P*(1≠ ÷). The reduction in moral hazard is therefore the smaller area BCED. In this
illustration, the previous coinsurance rate – is assumed to be smaller than ÷, in line with the model’s
estimates. This inequality is likely to hold in most settings because a standard coinsurance rate is
often 0.1 or 0.2. However, if the MPC were to exceed the previous coinsurance rate, then health
care consumption and moral hazard would increase in moving from a traditional insurance plan to
a HDHP/HSA contract.
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Figure 6: Reduction in moral hazard as a function of the MPC
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Note: This curve calculates 1  DWL1  DWL  assuming a coinsurance rate of 20 percent (  = 0.2) for myopia ranging from
0 to 1, using the formulas in equations (16) and (17). The negative slope of the curve demonstrates that greater levels
of myopia lead to smaller reductions in moral hazard. In the extreme case that myopia were zero, then moral hazard
would be eliminated. If myopia were equal to 0.8, then the consumer perceives the price of care as equivalent to that
from a 20 percent coinsurance rate, leaving the level of moral hazard unchanged. If myopia exceeds 1   , then moral
hazard would increase because consumers perceive a lower price of care with an HDHP/HSA than with a 20 percent
coinsurance rate.
9.2 Distortions in plan choices
Myopia can induce diﬀerent HDHP choices by allowing people to use HSA saving to reduce the
deductible. Table 10 presents the results of simulating plan choices using the choice model parameter
estimates from Table 8 and compares these choices to outcomes assuming consumers do not have
an HSA (so that myopia is zero by construction). Myopia leads more employees to choose higher
deductibles than they would if myopia were zero. The eﬀect of such plan choices on premiums
depends on the incremental costs of the risks choosing each plan. As in many settings, the employer
contributes a flat amount to the employee’s premium based on a percentage of the cost of the highest
deductible and sets premiums based on the average expected total cost among consumers enrolled
in each plan. Diﬀerences in the employee premium between plans is then due to diﬀerences in the
incremental cost of more generous coverage relative to the lowest highest deductible plan. Without an
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Note: This curve calculates 1 ≠ DWL1≠÷DWL– assuming a coinsurance rate of 20 percent (– = 0.2) for
MPC ranging from 0 to 1, usi g the formulas in equations (16) and (17). The negative slope of th
curve demonstrates that a higher MPC leads to smaller reductions in moral haza d. In the extreme
case that the MPC equals z o, then moral azard w uld be eliminated. If th MPC wer equal to
0.8, then the consumer perceives the price of care as equiv lent to that from a 20 percent coinsurance
rate, leaving the level of moral hazard unchanged. If the MPC exceeds 1 ≠ –, then moral hazard
would increase because consumers perceive a lower price of care with an HDHP/HSA than with a
20 percent coinsurance rate.
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Table 10: Coe cient of absolute risk aversion from calibration using HSA withdrawals
Quantity Estimate Gamble Interpretation
5th percentile 1.0◊ 10≠6 $999
10th percentile 1.0◊ 10≠6 $999
25th percentile 2.0◊ 10≠6 $998
Median 2.4◊ 10≠4 $805
75th percentile 8.0◊ 10≠4 $548
90th percentile 3.2◊ 10≠3 $210
95th percentile 5.0◊ 10≠3 $137
Note: This table presents results from the calibration that point-identifies risk aversion using de-
ductible choices, HSA withdrawals, marginal tax rates, and estimated cost distributions. Unlike
the choice model, this exercise does not make a distribution assumption on risk aversion or add
i.i.d. plan-specific normal errors. The column labeled Gamble Interpretation displays the amount
Y such that a consumer with the given level of risk aversion would be indi erent between accepting
and rejecting a 50-50 gamble of winning $1,000 and losing Y . The median level of risk aversion of
2.4 ◊ 10≠4 is close to the estimate from the choice model presented in Column 2 of 8, providing
support to the main results. The mean is less informative in this exercise because it is a ected by
the upper and lower bounds of the grid points chosen for the calibration.
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Table 11: HSA saving and plan choices by 401(k) loan status, 2008-2009
Panel A. Plan Choices by 401(k) loan status (%)

















Lowest deductible 49.0 42.8 47.0 42.1
2nd-lowest deductible 12.6 11.7 12.2 14.5
3rd-lowest deductible 10.3 11.8 14.3 15.0
Highest deductible 28.1 33.7 26.5 28.4





loan, avg. p-value from t-test
Deductible, self-coverage $1,934 $2,067 0.000
Deductible, family coverage $3,932 $4,033 0.037
HSA saving, employee $1,022 $1,186 0.000
HSA saving, employee + employer $1,825 $1,890 0.016
HSA disbursements $1,602 $1,443 0.000
Share of HSA assets withdrawn 0.79 0.67 0.000
Salary $50,075 $56,252 0.000
Note: This table presents statistics on plan choices, saving, and salaries for employees who take at
least one 401(k) loan in 2008 or 2009 and for other employees without a loan. Panel A lists the
market shares by plan for self and family coverage, consolidating choices in years 2008 and 2009 and
grouping deductibles by their relative size within each year. Employees with a 401(k) loan choose
the lowest deductible plan more often and the highest deductible plan less often. Panel B shows
means for deductibles, HSA and 401(k) saving, and salary and reports the p-values of t-tests that
the means are equal. In all cases, the means are statistically di erent, with employees with a 401(k)
loan choosing lower deductibles, saving less, and earning less than employees without 401(k) loans.
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Table 12: Market shares, average cost, and premiums of insurance plans by MPC
Incremental cost




÷ = 0 ÷¯ = 0.68 ÷ = 0 ÷¯ = 0.68 ÷ = 0 ÷¯ = 0.68
A. Self coverage
HDHP $1,350 35.9 50.1 5,692 6,080 3,283 2,107
HDHP $1,850 45.1 21.4 6,136 5,939 3,727 1,966
HDHP $2,400 15.1 18.1 4,047 4,332 1,638 359
HDHP $3,000 4.0 10.4 2,409 3,973 - -
B. Family coverage
HDHP $2,700 30.3 46.7 11,261 11,345 6,938 5,546
HDHP $3,700 58.0 37.2 10,439 10,039 6,116 4,240
HDHP $4,800 6.6 8.5 5,601 6,889 1,278 1,090
HDHP $6,000 5.2 7.7 4,323 5,799 - -
Note: This table calculates the market shares and average total costs without an HSA (÷ = 0) and
with an HSA with the MPC estimates reported in Table 1.9, which vary by age, income, and job
type (÷¯ = 0.68). Each row in the table corresponds to a di erent choice of insurance plan.
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CHAPTER 2 : Dying to Win? Olympic Gold Medals and Longevity
2.1. Introduction
Competition for status is ubiquitous in both professional and social settings. This
paper studies how status competition a ects long-term health. Disentangling the
relationship between status and health is challenging because several channels may
operate simultaneously. First, higher status can directly expand income opportuni-
ties or other real resources that impact health. Second, higher status may produce
psychological e ects on health, through changes in stress levels, for example. Third,
the very pursuit of status may harm health: time spent working may crowd out labor
inputs to health like exercise, or conspicuous consumption may displace inputs pur-
chased in the market like medical care. Fourth, obtaining higher status may a ect
future motivation and thereby influence real resources and health. Finally, a third
variable, such as latent ability, could independently determine both status and health.
The existing literature has struggled to separate these mechanisms. The Whitehall
studies of British civil servants provide epidemiological evidence of a positive rela-
tionship between status and health in an employment setting (Marmot et al., 1991),
but endogenous selection into jobs suggests causality does not run from status to
health (Chandra and Vogl, 2010; Case and Paxson, 2011). Other research focusing
on well-defined occupations in which status is based on receiving awards—Nobel lau-
reates, Oscar winners, and Major League Baseball Hall of Famers—also tends to find
a positive association between status and longevity (Sylvestre, Huszti, and Hanley,
2006; Becker, Chay, and Swaminathan, 2007; Rablen and Oswald, 2008). However,
unobserved heterogeneity between winners and losers and the non-random assignment
of status from these contests raises doubts that the results should be interpreted as
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measuring the e ect of status on health.
In this paper, I compare mortality between Gold and Silver medalists in Olympic
Track and Field between 1896 and 1948 to overcome these challenges. While the
setting is highly specific, its institutional features provide advantages that help to
cleanly identify status and distinguish between the channels listed above. Track and
Field includes events in running, jumping, and throwing that use only time or distance
to objectively measure performance. In each event, the order of finishers creates a
clear and undisputed ranking, even though the di erences between competitors may
be just fractions of a second. The stakes of such competition are high, with an
Olympic victory representing the pinnacle of the sport and carrying global recognition.
Variation in status is based simply on winning or losing.
Conditional on reaching the Olympic final, randomness plays a larger role in deciding
the di erence between winners and losers compared to contests judged over a longer
time period. The Olympic Gold medalist is determined on a single day every four
years. As I later document, the athlete with the best performance in the year prior
to the Olympics often fails to win the Olympic final. Additionally, more than half
of athletes who set a World Record never win Olympic Gold.46 Prior success clearly
does not guarantee victory in the Olympics.
Another advantage of this setting is that athletes are physically similar in terms of
their baseline health by virtue of their participation in the Olympic final. As sup-
porting evidence of this claim, I show that di erences in ability between Olympic
finalists—which may positively correlate with both health and winning—do not pre-
dict mortality by comparing athletes who ever held World Records (the highest ability
46This statistic excludes athletes who competed during the years when the Olympics was canceled
due to WWI and WWII and so is not artificially deflated.
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group) to those who never did. Since athletes are generally young during Olympic
competition, there is also less concern that results are biased by reverse causality
in which health determines status. However, performance-enhancing drugs (PEDs)
complicate this relationship to the extent that PEDs influence both health and the
chance of winning. Since it is di cult to determine which athletes use PEDs, I restrict
my analysis to the period 1896 to 1948, when there was less suspicion or evidence of
PEDs in Olympic competition.47
In addition, income directly earned from competition during this period was non-
existent due to the prevailing system of amateurism, which prevented athletes from
receiving financial compensation tied to their performance. Until the 1980s, regu-
lations prohibited professional athletes from competing in the Olympics and most
Olympians held other occupations while training. The Gold medal itself was also
worth a modest amount in terms of its metallic content (Economist, 2012).
Matching data on Olympic finishing order with each athlete’s date of birth and death,
I first document that Gold medalists die two years earlier than Silver medalists. I
estimate survival models that control for observables like height, weight, country,
event, and year of birth, which may be correlated with both finishing place and
longevity. I then analyze supplementary data on pre-Olympic performances and
post-Olympic earnings to test whether this pattern can be explained by an ath-
lete’s Olympic performance relative to his expectations—representing psychological
factors—or by income—representing real resources.
47The International Olympic Commission first produced a list of banned substances in 1968. Some
athletes experimented with substances to improve performance that also had health e ects in the
early 1900s, although doping strategies were not yet advanced. For example, George Hicks won the
1904 marathon after consuming raw egg, Strychnine (a poison that also functioned as a stimulant),
and brandy. Drugs yielding significant performance benefits like anabolic, androgenic steroids were
not used until the 1950s and amphetamines not until the 1960s (Wadler 1998, WADA 2010).
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Comprehensive data on annual rankings by event are used to construct each ath-
lete’s expected Olympic finish based on his pre-Olympic performances. An athlete’s
pre-Olympic rank serves as a clear reference point in this setting given the objec-
tive nature of competition. Gold medalists were ranked several places higher than
Silver medalists prior to the Olympics. So while Gold medalists by definition either
met or exceeded their expectations, Silver medalists outperformed their pre-Olympic
rank to a greater extent. Based on these rankings, Gold medalists expected to win
while Silver medalists were more often dark horses. The degree to which an athlete
outperforms expectations is positively correlated with lifespan, controlling for finish-
ing place. Importantly, the pattern also operates in reverse: Silver medalists who
were ranked first before the Olympics died earlier than other Silver medalists who
were not considered favorites. These findings are consistent with models of utility
based on success relative to a performance benchmark (Rayo and Becker 2007a,b)
and expectations-based reference dependence (Koszegi and Rabin, 2006).
While performance relative to expectations is positively correlated with lifespan, this
metric adds limited explanatory power and cannot fully reconcile the empirical pat-
tern between winning and a shorter life. In the baseline model, 30 percent of the
variation in lifespan is explained by finishing place and other observables. Including
the measure of relative performance increases this share to just 35 percent, and the
coe cient estimate on finishing place remains large and statistically significant.
There is more empirical support for income as the key mechanism between winning
and a shorter lifespan. Focusing on the sub-sample of U.S. athletes, I collect data
on earnings and occupational choices for athletes appearing in the 1940 U.S. Census,
which was the first Census to record income. Compared to Gold medalists, Silver
medalists earned higher incomes and were more likely to enter professional occupa-
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tions. Losing is again correlated with a lower hazard of death in this sub-sample,
but this e ect disappears once income is accounted for. There is a large and statisti-
cally significant association between higher income and a longer lifespan. Including
income explains 60 percent of the variation in lifespan, roughly twice as much as
baseline models with finishing place and other observables alone.
Additional analysis of the Census records of each athlete’s family provides suggestive
evidence that economic conditions in childhood were likely similar between Gold
and Silver medalists. I link athletes appearing in the 1940 Census to their family’s
earlier records in the 1910, 1920, and 1930 Censuses and collect the occupation of
each athlete’s parents. Using constructed earnings estimates by occupation from the
Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS), I test whether parental earnings
were equal between Gold and Silver medalists and fail to reject the null of no di erence
in means. In regression models, the coe cient estimate on the athlete’s income remain
a statistically significant predictor of lifespan while the estimate on parental earnings
is not. Based on a range of specifications and within-family income di erences, it
is unlikely that omitted variable bias explains the relationship between losing and
health. The analysis of Census records of each athlete’s post-Olympic earnings and
his family history is consistent with relative rank influencing motivation. The data
does not allow me to distinguish, however, whether losing motivates or winning de-
motivates.
The estimates are robust to estimating various parametric and semi-parametric sur-
vival models that make di erent assumptions about unobserved heterogeneity. The
results are also not sensitive to dropping any single year or country from the sample.
The correlation between winning and lifespan is larger in Olympic Games that were
more heavily publicized and in premiere events (such as the 100 meter dash), in which
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any e ect of winning on status is arguably greater. Finally, there is no evidence that
news coverage, which may correlate with both lifespan and income, predicts lifespan
based on analysis of textual data from U.S. newspapers.
This paper’s results challenge conventional wisdom and the conclusions from existing
studies that being awarded higher status necessarily improves health (Marmot et al.
1978, 1991; Sylvestre, Huszti, and Hanley 2006; Becker, Chay, and Swaminathan
2007; Rablen and Oswald 2008). Instead, losing can have positive, first-order e ects
on longevity. While Olympic Track and Field is a highly stylized setting, many people
face pivotal life events defined by either success or failure. This study may thus have
broader implications for understanding how the binary outcomes of important trials
in life can produce long-lasting consequences for health.
2.2. Status, Health, and the Olympics
Researchers cannot randomize people into groups of high and low status and measure
how long they live. Experimental studies among non-human primates, however, pro-
vide some insights into how random changes to status a ect health. Some biological
research shows that higher status can improve psychological and physical health by
reducing stress. One study of rhesus macaques pinpointed the molecular mechanisms
behind such psychosocial responses, demonstrating that manipulating social status
(dominance rank) a ects gene regulation tied to immune defense (Tung et al., 2012).
By contrast, other biological studies find that under certain conditions, such as when
the hierarchy is unstable, the highest-ranking animals experience the greatest stress
from psychosocial factors (Sapolsky, 2005). Yet even experimental studies have not
tracked the longevity of animals at di erent ranks of a randomly assigned hierarchy
85
to study long-term health outcomes.
Observational research in humans—mostly from the epidemiology and medical literature—
has generally found a positive gradient between health and status. The Whitehall
Study of British Civil Servants in the 1960s and its second iteration in the 1980s
demonstrate a marked social gradient in health across di erent ranks of government
employees (Marmot et al., 1978, 1991, 2001; Marmot and Feeney, 1997). Conventional
risk factors explain only one third of the di erence in mortality risk between cleri-
cal and administrative grades (Marmot and Brunner, 2005).48 The later Whitehall
research focuses on social support and the organization of the workplace as possible
channels between status and health.
While the Whitehall research clearly reveals an important and sizable link between
status and health, the likelihood of endogenous selection into Civil Service ranks
raises concerns about how to interpret the results. It is di cult to disentangle the
extent to which higher status led to better health or whether better unobserved
initial health led to or was otherwise correlated with higher status (Chandra and
Vogl, 2010). As evidence of selection, Case and Paxson (2011) find that current self-
assessed health in the Whitehall II sample predicts future civil service grade, but
current civil service grade does not predict future self-assessed health. In addition,
some research also disputes the mechanisms between status and health analyzed in
the Whitehall research. A prospective cohort study of Finnish industrial employees
found that low predictability at work was highly correlated with heart attack risk, but
other organizational factors highlighted by Whitehall—such as low decision autonomy
at work—were not (Vaananen et al., 2012).
48For heart disease, for example, clerical workers faced a relative risk of dying that was 2.2 times
higher than senior administrative sta , and 1.6 times higher than employees in intermediate profes-
sional and executive positions.
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Outside of Whitehall, research has examined major shocks to status from receiving
awards, such as winning the Nobel Prize (Rablen and Oswald, 2008), election to the
Major League Baseball (MLB) Hall of Fame (Becker, Chay, and Swaminathan, 2007),
or receiving an Oscar (Sylvestre, Huszti, and Hanley, 2006). The assumption behind
these studies has tended to be that status should improve health, and there is ev-
idence of this for the Nobel Prize and MLB Hall of Fame but inconclusive results
for Oscar winners. However, unobserved heterogeneity and the process of choosing
winners may limit what can be drawn from the findings. For example, the physical
attributes of Oscar nominees di er in ways that a ect their health, and bias may
stem from correlation with the likelihood of winning an Oscar. People may also
undertake di erent lifestyle decisions, follow di erent diets, and value their health
in unobserved ways. The same might be said for Nobel laureates and their peers.
Moreover, actors, baseball players, and academics are all professionals who can be
financially compensated for their work. Higher income associated with status may
thus confound comparisons of longevity within these populations. Since Track and
Field athletes in the early 1900s were all amateurs, the Olympic setting does not
face this problem. Another issue is that these other studies judge performance over
a longer time frame. For example, baseball players nominated for the Hall of Fame
are assessed over their entire career. The long duration of such assessment increases
the chance that the factors that lead people to succeed may be correlated with their
mortality prospects. It is reasonable to believe that there is less unobserved hetero-
geneity among Olympic athletes within any given event than among Nobel laureates,
Oscar nominees, or MLB players.49
49Not surprisingly, the longevity of Olympians is greater than the general population. Clarke
et al. (2012) document that Olympic medalists across all sports live almost 3 years longer than
other people of the same age, sex, and country. The research did not explore the reasons for this
di erence, which might be due to genetics, exercise, diet, income, status, or other factors.
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Although there is limited economic research on how status a ects health, economists
have studied the importance of social comparisons both from theoretical and em-
pirical perspectives.50 Recent models have incorporated peer comparisons and habit
formation, rather than assuming utility depends only on absolute consumption lev-
els. In this way, status conveys hedonic value as economic conditions are compared
to a benchmark that may depend on personal history, expectations, and the success
of one’s peers. For example, Rayo and Becker (2007a,b) develop a model in which
agents adjust to a time-varying reference point based on habits and peer compar-
isons, and make output choices given their preferences. Depending on the underlying
parameters, agents may fully adjust to their new reference point quickly or they may
habituate only partially and gradually over time. The speed of habituation a ects
how the agent views his current economic conditions compared to past successes or
failures.
In the Olympic setting, an athlete who performs better than expected and loses may
feel more content than an athlete who expected to win but finishes second. Studies
in psychology have examined the facial expressions of Olympic medalists as shown
on television to study their reaction soon after the event (Medvec et al., 1995; Mc-
Graw et al., 2005). McGraw et al. (2005) focus on the role expectations of finishing
place from Sports Illustrated previews and the athlete’s performance in the qualifying
rounds. Laboratory participants rated the facial expressions of athletes surpassing
their expectations as happier than if the athlete fell short of expectations. The study
points to the importance of counterfactual comparisons and emotions immediately
after competition. Yet performance in qualifying heats is a poor measure of ex-
pectations because to win an Olympic final, athletes aim to conserve energy while
50See for example Frank (1985); Easterlin (1995); Clark and Oswald (1996); Falk and Knell (2004);
Luttmer (2005); Rayo and Becker (2007b); He etz and Frank (2011); He etz (2011).
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advancing through qualifying rounds. My empirical analysis measures expectations
based on performances in pre-Olympic competition, which is a better metric of an
athlete’s beliefs regarding his finishing place in the Olympic final.
Lifestyle decisions and occupational choices represent a potentially important chan-
nel between status and health. In analyzing obituaries published in the New York
Times, Epstein and Epstein (2013) find that actors, singers, musicians, and athletes
die several years earlier than academics, politicians, business executives, and other
professionals. The study suggests the earlier death of the former group may result
from greater fame and risky behaviors. If success permanently shifts an agent’s ref-
erence point, risky activities may be rational attempts to attain the utility achieved
at the peak of professional success. After Olympic athletes are finished compet-
ing, their occupational choices and lifestyle decisions likely a ect their health too.
Such choices relate to how winning and losing influences motivation. Evidence from
field experiments is mixed on whether information about rankings is motivating or
discouraging; some research suggests peer comparisons improve future performance
(Tran and Zeckhauser 2012), while other studies find informing employees of their
relative rank reduces future e ort (Barankay 2012a,b).
2.3. Setting and Data
I focus on the setting of Track and Field because it is the oldest sport where per-
formance is objectively measured.51 Fewer nations and fewer athletes compete in
Swimming or Cycling than in Track and Field. I analyze male athletes only since
women did not compete in Olympic Track and Field until 1928, with some events
51The only sport for the first 13 of the ancient Olympic Games that began in 776 BC was a
1-stadium length sprint—called the “stadion”—measuring 192 meters (Perrottet, 2004).
89
being limited to males until the 1990s.
The data includes the order of finish in the Olympic final for each event, the country
the athlete competed for, and athlete’s birth and death dates, collected from a request
to the Olympic Studies Center of the International Olympic Committee and the site
SportsReference.com. I focus on comparing Gold to Silver medalists in the spirit of
a regression discontinuity design. For most athletes, the data also includes height
(measured in centimeters) and weight (measured in kilograms) at the time of the
Olympic Games. I calculate lifespan as the number of days between the athlete’s
dates of death and birth. In robustness tests in Section 2.7, I obtain similar results
using the date of the Olympics instead of the athlete’s date of birth to calculate
lifespan.
I classify “high ability” athletes as those who ever held multiple World Records,
including after the Olympic Games. Ability may be positively correlated with both
winning and latent health. I use two or more World Records as the threshold for high
ability in case athletic performances from the tails of a distribution are due to random
variation. An advantage of this metric for ability is that it is clearly defined.52
I impose several sample restrictions to cleanly focus on the relationship between
Olympic performance and lifespan. I exclude athletes with recorded deaths due to
war, accidents (car or plane), and murders because these causes are arguably exoge-
nous and unrelated to behavior. I am instead interested in any behavioral e ects
possibly associated with finishing place, so that deaths may be endogenously deter-
mined by the athlete’s performance in the Olympics. The site SportsReference.com
maintains a list of deaths from such causes that I draw from. Since this list may not
52The personal bests of each athlete over their career could be another way to control for ability,
but these are highly collinear with year of birth since each event’s top performances improve over
time.
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include all accidental deaths, I further exclude any athlete who died before age 50
to avoid analyzing early deaths. I also drop athletes whose date of death is missing
since I am unable to verify their death. Some of these athletes may still be alive, but
excluding them is a safer strategy since athletes who win Olympic medals are more
likely to have a recorded date of death than other finalists. As a result, no athletes
are censored in my data. This reduces my sample size by less than three percent.
Finally, I concentrate analysis on athletes who finish in the top two in a single Olympic
Games and single event, which constitutes the majority of Olympians. If athletes
compete in multiple Games, it is not clear how an athlete values each performance
relative to the other (e.g. whether the best or the final performance is more salient).
Since over three-quarters of the sample competes in a single Olympics, focusing on
these athletes provides a standard perspective. The results are robust to including
athletes who compete in multiple Olympic Games. After these restrictions, the final
sample includes 170 athletes with complete dates of birth, death, and finishing place.
Table 13 presents descriptive statistics of the sample, based on whether the athlete
won the Gold or Silver medal. Silver medalists live over 2 years longer than Gold
medalists, on average. This di erence is statistically significant as shown by the
final column. Other observable characteristics such as year of birth, height, weight,
and ability (as measured by holding multiple World Records) are balanced between
winners and losers.
2.4. Methods
The main identification strategy compares longevity between winners and losers in
each event and year of the Olympics. The hazard models outlined below include
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indicators for losing, event, and year to exploit within-event-year variation in lifespan,
as well as the athlete’s year of birth. Some models also include an indicator for
ability, defined as ever holding multiple World Records as described in Section 2.3.
This model does not control for country since there are few cases where pairs of
winners and losers in the same event and year compete for the same country. As
an alternative identification strategy, I compare the longevity of winners and losers
within countries and broad event classes, where similar events are grouped into sprints,
middle distance, distance, throws, field, or racewalk. I aggregate individual events in
this specification since including fixed e ects for both countries and events may create
an incidental parameters problem in non-linear models.53 To capture heterogeneity
in body types within event classes, I control for height in this specification.54 These
models also condition on ability and year of birth as in the main specification. As
shown in Section 2.5, the results are similar under both specifications, but I focus
on models using within-event-year identification since that comparison more directly
represents the cuto  between winning and losing.
I model lifespan using parametric and semi-parametric hazard models. While running
OLS on log life expectancy yields similar results, I present hazard models because the
data generating mechanism for mortality is likely to be Gompertz rather than log
normal. The Gompertz distribution has been the workhorse of actuarial science to
model mortality since the distribution provides a simple analytic formula for survival
based on the observation from many settings that mortality rises exponentially with
age (Olshansky and Carnes, 1997). Using simulations, Basu et al. (2004) show that
53The estimates are nonetheless similar if I include indicators for individual events rather than
the broader event classes.
54Medical research links height to an earlier death due to biological factors, such as reduced cell
replication and lower cancer incidence (Samaras 2012). The results in Section 5 are not sensitive to
including weight, which is highly correlated with height, or body mass index. I include height alone
to avoid potential collinearity problems.
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the Cox proportional hazard model performs better than log OLS under a Gompertz
data generating mechanism, even when there is no censoring. The Cox model is also
more e cient in terms of lower root mean square error. While the performance of the
Cox model is poor if the proportional hazards assumption is violated, I confirm the
proportional hazards assumption is met in my data using tests of Schoenfeld residuals.
The baseline model is the standard Cox proportional hazards model:
⁄ = ⁄0(t) exp(xÕ—) (2.1)
where the hazard of death ⁄ depends on an unspecified baseline hazard ⁄0(t) and
an exponential function of observables. The explanatory variable of interest is an
indicator for whether the athlete lost the Olympic final. Robust standard errors are
clustered by country and year.
As a parametric alternative to these Cox regression models, I also specify a Gompertz
distribution for the baseline hazard. In these models, I allow for individual-level frailty
that has a Gamma distribution by specifying the hazard as
⁄ = ‹i exp(xÕ— + “t) (2.2)
I also run models that allow for shared frailty by country. These models assume the
unobserved heterogeneity is constant over time. Finally, a robustness test described in
Section 2.7 estimates the increasingly mixed proportional hazards model of Frijters
et al. (2011) that models unobserved individual heterogeneity as a random walk.
The estimates are robust to estimating these various parametric and semi-parametric
survival models that make di erent assumptions about unobserved heterogeneity.
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2.5. Results
I first provide non-parametric, unconditional estimates of lifespan that preview my
main results. Figure 7 displays Kaplan-Meier survival curves that show Gold medal-
ists die younger than Silver medalists. By age 80, roughly half of Silver medalists
remain alive compared to a third of Gold medalists. These di erences are statistically
significant based on log-rank tests.
Table 14 presents the regression results of the survival models of lifespan described
above. The first two columns present Cox proportional hazard models that include
event and year fixed e ects. Columns 3 and 4 present Gompertz regressions with
shared frailty by country. Gold medalists represent the omitted finishing place. In
all cases, coe cient estimates are exponentiated and so should be interpreted as
hazard ratios. The hazard estimate of 0.570 indicates slightly over half as many
Silver medalists are expected to die at any point compared to Gold medalists. The
coe cient estimates on losing are statistically significant at the 1 percent level across
models. By contrast, estimates on year of birth and ability are not statistically
significant.
The results are also robust to including country fixed e ects and height as shown in
Table 15. This specification relies on within-country variation in winning and losing
rather than within-event-year pairs. Columns 1 and 2 present Cox regressions and
Columns 3 to 6 present Gompertz regressions that allow for shared frailty by country
and event. Across models, the coe cient estimates on losing range between 0.616
and 0.668, again indicating lower hazards of death among losers versus winners.
There is some evidence the relationship between losing and mortality is stronger in
specifications that focus on sub-samples of “premiere” events. Although determining
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which events the public cares most about is somewhat arbitrary, the marquee events
in Track are arguably the 100m, 200m, 400m, 1500m, and marathon and the marquee
Field events are the decathlon, high jump, and long jump. Table 16 presents Cox
regressions based on these sub-samples. The estimates based on within-event-year
comparisons (columns 1 and 2) are nearly equivalent to those from Table 14, while
the estimates based on within-country identification estimate a stronger relationship
between losing and mortality compared to Table 15. While the latter might be inter-
preted as suggestive evidence that shocks to status are greater in high-profile contests,
these regressions largely indicate similar patterns across events.
Similarly, one would expect the association between winning and mortality to be
stronger in Olympic Games that were more highly publicized if factors related to
status drive the results. To investigate this question, I run regressions that split the
sample into two halves before and after 1924. Table 17 shows the results are driven
by later Olympic Games, which were more widely covered through print media, radio,
and television. The 1924 Paris Games were the first to be broadcast on radio and the
1936 Berlin Games were the first to be televised, for example.55 In the later period,
the hazard estimates of 0.33 on losing indicates that one third of Silver medalists are
expected to die relative to Gold medalists at any given time. The estimates on losing
from the earlier period are still below 1 but not statistically significant.
55The Olympics received more news coverage in later years. Performing a search for articles with
the word “Olympics” on the New York Times site during the entire year of an Olympic Games
reveals the following counts: 1896: 81, 1900: 36, 1904: 201, 1908: 204, 1912: 533, 1920: 323, 1924:
1,170, 1928: 1,190, 1932: 1,490, 1936: 1,450, 1948: 695. It is not clear why the number of articles
drops o  in 1948, but one possibility is greater coverage on television and radio. There is a similar
pattern in coverage using nationwide results from the website newspaperarchive.com.
95
2.6. Mechanisms
This section investigates potential mechanisms driving the correlation between Olympic
finishing place and mortality. I assess whether mortality is explained by (1) how
Olympic finish compares to expectations and (2) income earned after Olympic com-
petition. To study the role of expectations, I construct a metric of expected finish-
ing place based on the performances of each athlete prior to the Olympics and test
whether the di erence between an athlete’s Olympic finish and his expected finish is
associated with lifespan. I find that out-performing expectations is positively corre-
lated with lifespan. While Gold medalists either met or exceeded expectations, Silver
medalists finished farther ahead of their pre-Olympic ranking. This pattern also op-
erates in reverse for “favorites” who lose: Silver medalists who were previously ranked
first die earlier than other Silver medalists. Yet performance relative to expectations
cannot fully reconcile the positive correlation between losing and a longer life. More
empirical support is found for income as the key mechanism between finishing place
and health. To analyze the role of income, I test whether lifespan is associated with
income as reported on the 1940 U.S. Census. Losers earned more money than winners
and after controlling for income, the estimated mortality hazard does not significantly
di er between winners and losers. Higher income has a large, positive, and statisti-
cally significant e ect on lifespan. Including income also explains roughly twice as
much variation in lifespan as the baseline regressions without it. Taken together,
these tests suggest that real resources are the key channel between status and health
within this sample.
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2.6.1. Performance Relative to Expectations
Expectations serve as a natural reference point for judging performance in this set-
ting. As McGraw, Mellers, and Tetlock (2005) argue, psychology suggests that an
athlete’s (ex ante) expectations a ect their perception of their actual performance,
ex post. In economic models of expectations-based reference-dependent preferences
(Koszegi and Rabin, 2006), measuring expectations is generally di cult outside of
the laboratory.56 The ability to observe recorded performances prior to the Olympics
provides an opportunity to cleanly measure expectations in the field. An athlete
whose win was expected may receive less of a boost to self-esteem than an athlete
who did not even expect to make the final and finished second. To the extent this
occurs, one reason Gold medalists die earlier than losers may be that the former were
already favored to win and the win represented more of a relief than any positive
psychic e ect.
To examine the role of prior expectations, I collect the top 100 annual performances
by each event. For each event and each Olympic Games, I construct a ranking of the
top performers in the 18 months prior to the date of the opening ceremonies of that
particular Olympics. An 18 month window provides a long enough window to rank
all athletes while still capturing performances close in time to the Olympic Games.57
Data on performances is collected from the site http://trackfield.brinkster.net and is
complete for events going back to 1920, with the exception of the racewalk. I rank
unique athletes, not performances, so that only the best performance of an athlete
counts towards the ranking.58 The assumption is that an athlete’s expected finish is
56See for example Abeler et al. 2011; Crawford and Meng 2011; Card and Dahl 2011; Gill and
Prowse 2012 for previous work measuring expectations in laboratory and field settings.
57I also obtain similar results if I use a 3-year window instead.
58In calculating the pre-Olympic rankings for the 100 meter and 1500 meter runs, I also consider
times posted in the 100 yard and mile runs, respectively, since the distances are extremely close. I
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based on him running his best time in recent years and all other competitors doing
the same.59
Table 18 presents the percentage of athletes who were ranked in the top 25, top
10, top 5, top 3, and first prior to the Olympics by finishing place. Gold medalists
tended to post the best performances prior to the Olympics. The median pre-Olympic
ranking of Gold medalists was 2nd compared to 6th for Silver medalists. Due to
positive surprise performances, the average ranking among Gold medalists was 7th
prior to the Olympics versus 16th for Silver medalists. Seventy percent of Gold
medalists were ranked in the top 3 leading up to the Games compared to 40 percent of
Silver medalists. These tabulations of prior performances suggest that Gold medalists
likely expected to win more often than Silver medalists. Although being ranked
higher before the Olympics increases the chances of victory in the Games “when it
counts”, success is far from predetermined. This pattern supports the argument that
conditional on making an Olympic final, chance plays a key role in assigning status.
I construct an empirical measure of relative performance based on the di erence be-
tween each athlete’s finishing place and his pre-Olympic ranking. Figure 8 plots the
distribution of relative performance, defined as pre-Olympic ranking minus Olympic
finish. Most athletes were ranked within the top 3. Figure 9 presents a scatterplot
of lifespan against this metric of relative performance. There is a positive correla-
tion between lifespan and the numbers of places ahead of expectations an athlete
finished, driven by athletes previously ranked outside the top 3. This analysis is now
implemented in a regression framework.
subtract 18 seconds from mile times to convert to 1500 meter times and multiply 100 yard times by
1.1 to convert to 100 meter times. These conversions are consistent with the scoring metrics of the
International Association of Athletics Federations.
59I only observe the top 100 performances by event and year, rather than the full history of each
athlete’s performances. With the full history, another approach would be to construct distributions
of expected finish.
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Table 19 presents Cox regressions that include measures of performance relative to
expectations. Expectations help to explain the earlier death of winners, even condi-
tional on finishing place. Column 1 reports the specification without the expectations
variables for reference.60 Columns 2 and 3 include the di erence between pre-Olympic
ranking and Olympic finish. Consistent with the scatterplot, the estimated hazard
of death is lower the more that an athlete’s Olympic finish exceeds his pre-Olympic
ranking. To interpret the magnitude of this estimate, a one-standard deviation in-
crease in this di erence is associated with a mortality hazard of 0.734. Including the
variable for expectations barely alters the estimate on losing, however, which remains
statistically significant. Similar patterns are shown in column 3, which present re-
gressions that include an indicator for whether an athlete was ranked outside the top
20 before the Olympics. The hazard estimate of 0.422 on this variable is lower than
the estimate on losing, and both are statistically significant.
To study the e ect of “underperforming” on health, I construct an indicator for
whether the athlete was ranked first before the Olympics and lost. Intuitively, Silver
medalists who were considered favorites were likely more disappointed than athletes
who were ranked lower and also lost. The final column of Table 19 display the
results of this specification. As shown by the hazard estimates above unity on the
interaction term, losing athletes who were ranked first die earlier than other losing
athletes. This finding is consistent with favorites who fail to win experiencing more
stress or disappointment that is harmful to health compared to Silver medalists with
lower expectations.
While performance relative to expectations is positively correlated with lifespan, this
metric adds limited explanatory power and cannot fully reconcile the empirical pat-
60This is a subsample of that presented in Table 14 because rankings are not available for all
events in all years.
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tern between winning and a shorter life. The third row from the bottom of Table 19
presents the share of explained variation, similar to an R2 from a linear regression, as
developed by Royston (2006).61 In the baseline model, 26.6 percent of the variation in
lifespan is explained by finishing place and other observables. Including the measure
of relative performance increases this share to just 29.4 percent, and the coe cient
estimate on finishing place remains large and statistically significant.
2.6.2. Income and Occupational Choices
Real resources like income represent a potentially important mechanism between sta-
tus and health, either through earnings from winning or by influencing future mo-
tivation. The institutional features of this setting make income earned as a direct
result of competition limited. Amateurism prevailed until the 1980s and these regu-
lations were strictly enforced, as evidenced by Jim Thorpe—the legendary multi-sport
athlete—being stripped of his 1912 Olympic Gold medals for earning money to play
minor league baseball in 1909 and 1910 (Flatters, 2000). Most athletes held other
occupations while training between Olympic Games.62 An illuminating account of
what could be expected financially after the Olympics comes from the autobiography
of Mel Sheppard, a Gold medalist in the 1908 Games. Sheppard describes the part-
ing words he and his Track and Field teammates received from President Theodore
Roosevelt after returning from the Olympics during a visit to the White House: “I’m
going to give you lads the same friendly bit of advice I gave to my Rough Riders.
Remember you’re heroes for ten days—when that time’s up, drop the hero business
61As Royston (2006) describes, this statistic is a modification of that proposed by Nagelkerke
(1991) based on the likelihood ratio statistic.
62For example, Hannes Koheleman—a Gold medalist distance runner—laid bricks in construction
(see The New York Times, “Hannes Kolehmainen, Marathon Champion, is Now U.S. Citizen,”
January 15, 1921) and Charlie Paddock—a Silver medalist sprinter—worked for a newspaper (see
Dallas Morning News, “Obituary: Paddock, Charles William.” July 23, 1943).
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and go to work” (Sheppard, 1924, p52). The Gold medal itself was worth a modest
amount in terms of its metallic content.63
While financial rewards from competition were limited, athletes may have pursued
various occupations after their athletic career ended, and income from these life de-
cisions may be important to health. Occupational choices after the Olympics help
shed light on whether losing serves to motivate. To study this channel, I collect data
from the 1940 Census for the sub-sample of U.S. athletes competing between 1920
and 1936. The 1940 Census was the first to record income. Specifically, the survey
records annual wage income in 1939 as well as whether the respondent received any
supplemental income from other sources. In addition, the 1940 Census also records
information on occupation, home ownership, labor supply, race, marital status, and
education. The individual records of each Census respondent become publicly avail-
able 72 years after the survey, enabling me to observe these variables for my sample
of U.S. athletes.
The geneology website Ancestry.com provides digitized Census records from each
Census from 1850 through 1940, which can be used to identify specific people based
on information recorded in the surveys. To retrieve the records for each U.S. athlete,
I first searched using the athlete’s name, year of birth, and state of birth. I also
followed the “Suggested Hints” provided by Ancestry, which link to other Census
records as well as other documents like birth, marriage, and death certificates and
army registration cards. These hints are created through a machine learning process
and through the family trees built by geneological research that link historical records
together. In some cases, the names on the original hand-written Census records are
63Before 1912, the gold in the winner’s medal was worth about $350 adjusting for inflation and
the commodity prices of the year it was awarded (The Economist, 2012). After 1912, gold was no
longer used and the winner’s medal was made mostly of silver and copper, making it worth even
less.
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imprecise, leading to the digitized records to be misspelled and requiring additional
strategies to search for athletes.64 To locate athletes whose names do not appear on
any of the search returns, I conduct a geographical search that starts with recent
known street addresses from either 1930 Census records or army registration cards.
The army registration cards also include the date of birth, rather than simply the year
of birth as recorded in the Census records, which increases the likelihood of a match
along with the athlete’s name and place of birth. I then work backwards, manually
combing through the the list of Census records from a specific geographical location
to retrieve the records of athletes whose names have been misspelled. When street
addresses are not available, I begin with all males born in the athlete’s state of birth
during a 1-year window (older and younger) around the athlete’s year of birth.
This process retrieves 80 percent of U.S. athletes in the 1940 Census who competed
between 1920 and 1936. This high rate is achieved by a detailed inspection for each
athlete based not only on searching by name, but also on geographic and demographic
information collected from other biographical sources to narrow the search process.
Other studies in economic history that merge individual records across surveys by
surname, year of birth, and place of birth, tend to have substantially lower match
rates because they use much larger samples of Census data (see e.g. Abramitzky et al.
2012, 2014; Bleakley and Ferrie 2016).
The 1940 Census includes variables for wage income earned in 1939 and whether
any income was earned from supplemental sources (yes or no). The survey also
collects the number of weeks worked in 1939, number of hours worked the prior
64
For example, Ancestry’s digitized records mistakenly list Edward Gourdin as Edward Gonodin,
Robert Van Osdel as Robert Van Vadel, Leo Sexton as Leo Septon, and Raymond Barbuti as
Raymond Barbutte.
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week, whether the person owns their home or rents, and their stated occupation and
industry of employment. The digitized records available on Ancestry include the name
of the occupation but not the 3-digit occupation code used for classification, which
are instead only listed on the hand-written sheets. I collect the 3-digit occupation
codes for each athlete from their original Census records. The 1910, 1920, and 1930
Censuses include occupation and industry but not income. I link athletes to these
earlier surveys to record the occupations of their parents.
Earnings by occupation are imputed following two approaches. The first approach
uses the average earnings by 3-digit occupation code as reported in the 100% 1940
IPUMS Census file. There are 235 di erent occupation codes in the 1940 Census
classification. The IPUMS mean earnings by occupation include both salary and
other income, using data from the 1950 Census, and combine earnings for both males
and females. The second approach is based on 15 di erent industry classifications in
1925 as reported in Margo (2006): gas and electricity; farming; manufacturing; min-
ing; construction; railroad; telephone; wholesale and retail trade; finance, insurance,
and real estate; domestic services; medical services; public school teachers; nonprofit
services; personal services; and government. This approach relies on assigning the al-
phabetic occupation and industry fields recorded on the Census records to one of these
15 industries, and so is less precise than using the 1940 numeric occupational codes.
While the first approach using 3-digit occupation codes is the preferred method since
it is more detailed, the results are nevertheless qualitatively similar in both cases.
Data on occupational choices and average annual earnings by occupation is presented
in Table 20. For comparison, the first two columns list the percentage of each occu-
pational category and the average earnings for all U.S. males aged 20 and older in the
labor force, respectively. These statistics are tabulated from the 100 percent sample
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of the 1940 Census made available through the Integrated Public Use Microdata Se-
ries (IPUMS). The IPUMS sample, which excludes any identifying information but
is useful to gauge broader trends, constructs a measure of average earnings by 3-digit
occupation code. Table 20 then aggregates these codes up to broader occupational
categories following the IPUMS census classification. At the high end of the earnings
distribution, professional workers earned the most money, followed by proprietors,
managers, and o cials. At the bottom of the income distribution, farm laborers and
domestic services earned the least.
The corresponding statistics for Gold and Silver medalists are presented in Columns
3 to 6 of Table 20. While both groups entered occupations that earned substan-
tially more than the U.S. average, Silver medalists chose occupations that paid more
than occupations chosen by Gold medalists. The large majority of Silver medalists
were classified as Professional Workers and entered occupations, including physicians,
with particularly high earnings. Gold medalists were more likely to be classified as
Proprietors, Managers, and O cials. A common occupation among Gold medalists
was athletic coach, which the Census classifies as a Semi-Professional Worker. In my
sample, the average earnings of Silver medalists were 16 percent higher than Gold
medalists based on di erences in occupational choices.
Table 21 reports results of Cox regressions that include variables for income, labor
supply, home ownership, and demographics, as collected from the Census for each
athlete in the U.S. sub-sample. Without controlling for income, losing is again cor-
related with a lower mortality hazard as shown in Column 1. This specification also
includes year and event class e ects, height, year of birth, and indicators for White
and married. The coe cient estimate on losing is large in magnitude and statistically
significant, similar to the results from the full sample. Including income in Column
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2 drives the estimate on losing closer to 1, and it is no longer statistically significant.
By contrast, higher income correlates with a lower mortality hazard. The coe cient
estimates on both income variables are large and statistically significant. Includ-
ing income also explains 57.8 percent of the variation in lifespan as reported by the
modified R2 statistic, compared to just 30.8 percent with finishing place and other
observables in Column 1. As shown in Column 3, which includes the number of weeks
worked and excludes income, labor supply alone explains far less of the variation in
lifespan. Column 4 includes both income and labor supply and demonstrates that
income is a strong predictor of mortality. In this sub-sample, the association between
winning and an earlier death is explained by higher income among Silver medalists.
To test whether income or expectations are a stronger predictor of lifespan, Columns
6 through 10 include both sets of variables. A few athletes who competed in the
racewalk or steeplechase are dropped because historical times are unavailable for these
events. Column 6 replicates the main results excluding both expectations and income
for comparison. In this sub-sample, outperforming expectations is not correlated
with a longer lifespan as shown in Column 7. Income is again negatively correlated
with mortality as shown in Columns 8 through 10. These results provide suggestive
evidence that real resources are the key mechanism between status and health in this
sample.65
65By comparison, other estimates of the role of income on mortality vary widely based on age and
the type of data, ranging from zero to roughly twice as large as my estimates (Smith, 1999; Deaton
and Paxson, 2001; Deaton, 2003; Cutler et al., 2011)
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Income and occupations of parents
While losers earned more than winners after the Olympics, it is possible that an
athlete’s occupational choices and earnings were influenced by that of his parents.
This section tests whether parental earnings di er systematically across Silver and
Gold medalists, which would constitute a source of omitted variable bias if living
standards in childhood are correlated with mortality. To study each athlete’s family
history, I collect their parent’s occupations recorded in the 1910, 1920, and 1930
Censuses, when the athletes were in childhood.66 I impute earnings for their parents’
occupations based on the IPUMS occupation codes from the 1940 Census. In the
few cases in which a parent held multiple occupations over di erent waves of the
Census, I calculate the average of the two earnings estimates. As a second measure of
parental earnings, I also assign the industry-specific average earnings in 1925, which
is closer to the time period of Census surveys, collected from Margo (2006). In
both cases, parental earnings are not statistically di erent between Gold and Silver
medalists based on a simple t-test (with the parents of Gold medalists having slightly
higher earnings). Failing to reject the null hypothesis that parental earnings are equal
between winners and losers can be interpreted as another test of balance between the
two groups, now on childhood economic conditions.
Table 22 presents results from Cox regressions that include parental earnings along
with the individual athlete’s income and other Census variables. Since hazard models
of mortality cannot include individual fixed e ects, these specifications use informa-
tion about parental earnings to control for unobservables at the family level. Columns
1 to 4 use imputed parental earnings based on 1925 industry occupations and Columns
66More specifically, I record the occupation of the household head, which was the father in most
cases.
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5 to 8 use imputed parental earnings based on 1940 occupational codes. Column 1
includes the athlete’s income and that of his parents in logs and Column 2 in levels.
The coe cient estimates on parental earnings are not statistically significant while
those on the athlete’s income once again are. The specifications in Columns 3 and 4
includes the di erence between athlete’s income and parental income. This measure
of the within-family di erence in income is positively related to the athlete’s lifespan
and highly significant. The results are similar when parental income is imputed using
1940 occupation codes in Columns 5 to 8. Taken together, the analysis of Census
records are consistent with idea that relative rank influences motivation. The data




This section tests whether news coverage, which may be correlated with both win-
ning and income, explains lifespan. Even though amateurism prevented athletes being
directly compensated for their performance, it is possible that athletes received non-
monetary rewards, like housing or job opportunities, that could have first-order e ects
on longevity. To study this mechanism, I collect text-based data on newspaper cover-
age of each athlete from the website newspaperarchive.com.67 I focus on U.S. athletes
among the Census sub-sample because the site mainly includes U.S. newspapers and
to compare the importance of news coverage against income income as a mechanism.
For each athlete, I search for stories containing their first and last name, the word
67Other research on news coverage has also used data from this source (Gentzkow et al., 2011)
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“Olympics”, and the year and event they participated in.68 I record the number of
news stories within two decades of the Olympic Games the athlete competed in. The
rationale for restricting coverage to this period is that any changes to living stan-
dards as a result of Olympic performance are likely to be reflected in coverage closer
to the competition. For example, there was very little newspaper coverage of athletes
competing in the first few Olympic Games, but much more coverage in the 1960s and
later after most were deceased.69
Table 23 reports hazard regressions that include newspaper coverage variables esti-
mated on the U.S. sub-sample with Census records. Columns 1 and 2 present Cox
regressions with variables for news coverage along with finishing place, with Column 1
including the count of stories and Column 2 including an indicator for over 50 stories
to allow for non-linearity. Losing has a strong and statistically significant association
with lifespan, while variables for news coverage do not. Columns 3 through 4 include
variables for news coverage and income, omitting finishing place (which is positively
correlated with coverage). As before, higher income is associated with lower haz-
ards of death, and the coe cient estimates on news coverage are not statistically
significant. Columns 5 and 6 include variables for finishing place, news coverage,
and income. These regressions do not suggest that media exposure influences mor-
tality. News coverage also provides limited explanatory power in contrast to income,
as shown at the bottom of the table.
68In case the athlete is known primarily by his nickname, I also include searches that replace the
athlete’s first name with the nickname reported on sportsreference.com. In addition, since the long
jump was historically called the “broad jump” during my sample, I search for this term in that event.
69The post-1950s coverage of athletes competing in the first modern Olympic Games tends to
recount the experience of these early athletes to establish the history of the Games.
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Mean reversion
The correlation between finishing place and mortality is unlikely to be driven by
regression to the mean. Due to variability in performance, those ranked below the
mean before the Olympics are likely to rank closer to the mean in the Olympic final.
The winner in the Olympics may have previously been ranked closer to the mean,
finding himself the fortunate recipient of good luck on the day that counts. As
discussed earlier, such variation in performance is key to the identification strategy.
For mean reversion to explain the relationship between losing and lifespan, however,
performance would have to correlate contemporaneously with mortality risk. It seems
possible that performance could correlate with other measures of current health, such
as resting heart rate or VO2max, but unlikely it would correlate with long-term health
outcomes like mortality.
2.7. Robustness
I perform several checks to verify the validity of the results. First, the results are
robust to specifying lifespan using the start date of the Olympic Games rather than
the athlete’s birthdate, as shown in Table 24. One rationale for using the date of
first Olympic competition to “start the clock” is that participation in the Olympics
represents the timing of the shock to status. This timing issue is less relevant empir-
ically in my setting where athletes are largely the same age at competition than in
the context of Nobel laureates or Oscar winners, where variation in ages of winners
and losers is greater. In addition, I test that no single year is overly influential in
the analysis by dropping each year in turn (Table 25). I also verify that no single
country drives the results by dropping each country in turn (results not shown). In
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both cases, the main estimates are robust.
Comparing Silver to Gold medalists presents the sharpest cut-o  between winning
and losing, but the results also hold when including other Olympic finalists who also
lost (Table 26). Columns 1 to 4 present Cox regressions that compare the longevity of
Gold medalists to that of Silver medalists, Bronze medalists, and 4th place finishers.
Again, losing is associated with a lower hazard of death, and the estimates are similar
to the main results. Columns 5 through 8 compare Gold medalists to all other finalists
(up to 8th place). Gold medalists consistently die earlier than all losers.
Finally, I estimate hazard models that allow for individual time-variant unobserved
heterogeneity by specifying the individual heterogeneity as a random walk as in the
Increasingly Mixed Proportional Hazards (IMPH) model developed by Frijters et al.
(2011). I draw 8000 sample paths of the random walk for each individual and then
average the estimates over these draws. As described by Frijters et al. (2011), allowing
for time-variant unobservables is intuitively appealing when the researcher observes
detailed information about the individual during the baseline period but less about
him later in life. This situation characterizes my setting, where there is arguably little
unobserved heterogeneity in health status at the time of the Olympic final but many
lifestyle decisions and shocks after the competition are unobserved. The coe cient
estimates are similar to those presented in the main analysis.
2.8. Conclusion
This paper has compared the longevity of Olympic Track and Field athletes to investi-
gate how competition for status influences health. Counterintuitively, Silver medalists
live over two years longer than Gold medalists, on average. The institutional features
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of the Olympic setting—though highly stylized—allow status to be cleanly identified.
The sharp cuto  between winning and losing in the Olympic final helps to reduce
possible unobserved heterogeneity between athletes. I also demonstrate that winners
and losers are balanced in terms of observables like height, ability, and age, and that
awarding status involves a large degree of randomness, likely because it is a physical
contest held on a single day every four years. Specific features of the setting are also
instrumental in isolating di erent channels between status and health. In particular,
there is less concern of reverse causality here than other contests, at least during the
period before the rise of performance-enhancing drugs that I study. The prevailing
system of amateurism also prevented any compensation to be earned directly from
competition.
Using individual Census records of each athlete and his family, I find empirical sup-
port for occupational choices and income as the key channel between status and
health. Silver medalists pursued occupations that paid more money than those cho-
sen by Gold medalists. Income, which is reported in the 1940 Census, is positively
correlated with lifespan in the sample and fully accounts for the relationship between
losing and mortality. Including income in regression models also explains roughly
twice as much variation in mortality as other observables. To test whether childhood
economic conditions were similar between Gold and Silver medalists, I link athletes to
their family’s earlier records in 1910, 1920, and 1930 Censuses and impute parental
incomes based on their occupations. The failure to reject the null that parental
incomes were equal between Gold and Silver medalists provides another test of bal-
ance. Based on a range of specifications and estimation methods, it is unlikely that
omitted variable bias explains these patterns. Since amateurism limited any income
earned from competition, the analysis of Census records is consistent with relative
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rank influencing motivation. Data limitations prevent me from determining whether
losing motivates or winning de-motivates, however. It is important to note that if
Gold medalists enjoyed more income-related opportunities from winning than Silver
medalists, such benefits should reduce Gold medalists’ mortality risks, not increase
them.
There are several limitations of the study. In terms of data, many decisions and
shocks after the Olympics are unobserved. The Census records add key information
about occupational choices, income, and marital status, but lifestyle factors are likely
to matter as well. For example, decisions about smoking and alcohol consumption
would be informative to study behavioral responses to winning and losing. I attempt
to measure potential psychological responses captured by how performance compares
to expectations, and find less support for this mechanism than income. Second,
data on each athlete’s income after the Olympics is measured only once in 1940.
One would ideally observe multiple years of earnings, although lifetime earnings are
clearly endogenous. For each athlete’s parents, income must also be imputed in the
pre-1940 Censuses based on occupation since it is not collected in the survey. Third,
the sample size is small, especially on the U.S. sub-sample with Census records. A
larger sample could help to improve precision of the estimates and increase confidence
in the results. Finally, the setting of Olympic Track and Field raises questions about
external validity. This study’s findings may be applicable more broadly insofar as the
pivotal events in people’s lives resemble such competition.
Despite these limitations, this paper’s findings challenge conventional wisdom and
the conclusions from existing studies that being awarded higher status necessarily im-
proves health (Marmot et al. 1978, 1991; Sylvestre, Huszti, and Hanley 2006; Becker,
Chay, and Swaminathan 2007; Rablen and Oswald 2008). Instead, losing can have
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positive, first-order e ects on longevity. The most important trials in our lives often
involve a binary outcome, like victory or defeat. This paper’s results suggest how
people respond to such successes or failures can produce long-lasting consequences
for health.
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2.9. Tables & Figures
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Note: This figure plots the proportion of athletes still alive at each age by Gold or Silver medal
status. The gap that persists around age 55 between the dotted line (Silver medalists) and the solid
line (Gold medalists) illustrates that Silver medalists live longer than Gold medalists.
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Table 13: Descriptive Statistics
1st place (N=72) 2nd place (N=98) p-value from
Variable Mean s.d. Min Max Mean s.d. Min Max t-test of di erence
Lifespan (years) 75.24 10.15 53.85 96.03 78.09 10.56 50.53 100.77 0.078
Distance (1=yes, 0=no) 0.15 0.36 0 1 0.15 0.36 0 1 0.996
Middle-distance (1=yes, 0=no) 0.08 0.28 0 1 0.10 0.30 0 1 0.529
Sprints (1=yes, 0=no) 0.25 0.44 0 1 0.23 0.42 0 1 0.590
Field (1=yes, 0=no) 0.38 0.49 0 1 0.34 0.47 0 1 0.354
Throwing (1=yes, 0=no) 0.11 0.32 0 1 0.14 0.34 0 1 0.423
Year of birth 1898.2 14.94 1869 1926 1899.0 14.34 1871 1925 0.548
Ever set World Record (1=yes, 0=no) 0.03 0.17 0 1 0.04 0.19 0 1 0.642
Height (cm) 181.3 7.78 162 193 180.25 6.69 160 195 0.410
Weight (kg) 75.12 11.94 53 108 74.14 11.78 51 110 0.641
Note: This table displays statistics on lifespan and various observables for Gold and Silver medalists. The final column presents the p-value
from the t-test that the means of the corresponding variable are equal between Gold and Silver medalists. Silver medalists live over 2 years
longer than Gold medalists and this di erence is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. There are not statistically significant di erences
in the mean year of birth, height, weight, the types of events, or the number of World Record holders between Gold and Silver medalists,
demonstrating balance between the two groups of athletes. Height data is available for 133 athletes. Weight data is available for 130 athletes.
The other variables are available for 170 athletes.
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Table 14: Lifespan Regressions with Event and Year Fixed E ects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cox Cox Gompertz Gompertz
Lose (1=yes, 0=no) 0.561*** 0.563*** 0.551*** 0.555***
(-3.10) (-3.04) (-3.03) (-2.98)
Year of birth 0.959 0.960 0.962 0.963
(-1.05) (-1.03) (-1.16) (-1.11)
Ever set World Record 0.903 0.822
(1=yes, 0=no) (-0.30) (-0.36)
Year e ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual event e ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country e ects No No No No
Event class e ects No No No No
Frailty None None Country Country
Observations 170 170 170 170
Log likelihood -676.49 -676.47 128.76 128.82
Note: This table presents exponentiated coe cient estimates (hazard ratios) from survival model
regressions. Losing is defined as finishing in second place. The coe cient estimate below 1 on
losing indicates the hazard of death is lower among Silver medalists than Gold medalists. Ro-
bust t-statistics clustered by country-year in parentheses, except in shared frailty models. *p<0.1,
**p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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Table 15: Lifespan Regressions with Country Fixed E ects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cox Cox Gompertz Gompertz Gompertz Gompertz
Lose (1=yes, 0=no) 0.668* 0.665* 0.649** 0.655** 0.616** 0.628**
(-1.93) (-1.94) (-2.09) (-2.01) (-2.27) (-2.14)
Year of birth 0.989 0.989 0.988 0.988 0.995 0.995
(-1.30) (-1.30) (-1.25) (-1.25) (-0.51) (-0.48)
Height (cm) 1.015 1.015 1.017 1.017 1.006 1.005
(0.82) (0.85) (1.06) (1.03) (0.33) (0.28)
Ever set World Record 1.065 0.904 0.767
(1=yes, 0=no) (0.15) (-0.20) (-0.48)
Year e ects No No No No No No
Event e ects No No No No No No
Country e ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Event class e ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Frailty None None Country Country Event Event
Observations 133 133 133 133 133 133
Log likelihood -503.26 -503.25 86.93 86.95 89.05 89.17
Note: This table presents exponentiated coe cient estimates (hazard ratios) from survival model
regressions with country fixed e ects. All regressions also include indicators for event classes (sprints,
middle distance, distance, throws, field, and racewalk), rather than individual events as in Table
2. Similar to Table 2, the coe cient estimate below 1 on losing indicates the hazard of death is
lower among Silver medalists than Gold medalists. Robust t-statistics clustered by event-year in
parentheses, except in shared frailty models. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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Table 16: Cox Regressions: “Premiere” Events Sub-Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lose (1=yes, 0=no) 0.543** 0.557** 0.434** 0.459*
(-2.10) (-2.05) (-1.97) (-1.71)
Year of birth 1.015 1.025 1.007 1.007
(0.18) (0.31) (0.40) (0.39)
Ever set World Record 0.594 0.591
(1=yes, 0=no) (-0.42) (-0.61)
Height (cm) 0.925** 0.922**
(-2.02) (-2.01)
Year e ects Yes Yes No No
Event e ects Yes Yes No No
Country e ects No No Yes Yes
Event class e ects No No Yes Yes
Observations 63 63 53 53
Log likelihood -183.53 -183.39 -142.89 -142.81
Note: Note: This table presents exponentiated coe cient estimates (hazard ratios) from Cox regres-
sions among the sub-sample of events of 100 meters, 200 meters, 400 meters, 1500 meters, marathon,
decathlon, high jump, and long jump. The coe cient estimates on losing are slightly smaller to those
presented in Tables 2 and 3—which is consistent with these events being considered premiere events
in Track and Field—but the di erences are not statistically distinguishable. Robust t-statistics
clustered by country-year (column 1-2) and by event-year (columns 3-4) in parentheses. *p<0.1,
**p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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Table 17: Cox Regressions by Year of Olympic Games
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Years: 1896-1920 Years: 1924-1948
Lose (1=yes, 0=no) 0.639 0.645 0.417*** 0.408***
(-1.60) (-1.60) (-3.14) (-3.22)
Year of birth 0.963 0.983 0.860** 0.861**
(-0.61) (-0.27) (-2.02) (-1.99)
Ever set World Record 0.194*** 1.398
(1=yes, 0=no) (-3.16) (0.84)
Year e ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Event e ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country e ects No No No No
Event class e ects No No No No
Observations 90 90 80 80
Log likelihood -298.52 -297.47 -248.53 -248.43
Note: This table presents exponentiated coe cient estimates (hazard ratios) from Cox regressions
that split the sample by years 1896 to 1920 (columns 1 and 2) and years 1924 to 1948 (columns 3
and 4). Robust t-statistics clustered by country-year in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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Median Ranking before Olympics 2 6
Mean Ranking before Olympics 7.5 16.4
Top 1 before Olympics (percent) 35.0 15.0
Top 3 before Olympics (percent) 70.0 40.0
Top 5 before Olympics (percent) 77.5 48.3
Top 10 before Olympics (percent) 87.5 58.3
Top 25 before Olympics (percent) 92.5 85.0
Note: This table displays the average rank and percentage of the sample by their pre-Olympic
ranking for Gold and Silver medalists. Rankings are calculated based on the 18 months prior to the
opening ceremony of each Olympics.
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Pre-Olympic ranking minus Olympic finish
Note: This histogram plots the empirical distribution of the di erence between pre-Olympic
ranking and Olympic finishing place (pre-Olympic ranking minus Olympic finish). Pre-Olympic
rankings are calculated using an 18 month window prior to the Olympics. Histogram has unit bin
width.
121













0 50 100 150
Pre-Olympic ranking minus Olympic finish
Second place First place
Note: This scatterplot displays the lifespan for each observation in the sample on the vertical axis.
The horizontal di erence plots the di erence between the athlete’s ranking based on pre-Olympic
performance and their finish in the Olympic games (pre-Olympic ranking minus Olympic finish).
Silver medalists are indicated by hollow circles and Gold medalists are indicated by solid circles.
The distribution shows that most Gold medalists were ranked within the top-5 before the
Olympics, while many Silver medalists were ranked outside the top-5.
122
Table 19: Cox Regressions: Role of Prior Expectations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lose (1=yes, 0=no) 0.443*** 0.455*** 0.472*** 0.277***
(-2.78) (-2.75) (-2.69) (-4.30)
Di erence between pre-Olympic ranking 0.989**
and Olympic finish (-2.43)
pre-Olympic ranking greater than 20 0.422**
(1=yes, 0=no) (-2.33)
Ranked 1st before Olympics 0.403**
(-1.96)
Ranked 1st before Olympics ◊ Lose 5.055**
(2.30)
Year of birth 0.964 0.928 0.925 0.977
(-0.49) (-1.05) (-1.08) (-0.28)
Year e ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Event e ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country e ects No No No No
Event class e ects No No No No
Modified R2 based on Royston (2006) 0.266 0.294 0.295 0.308
Observations 100 100 100 100
Log Likelihood -340.32 -337.68 -337.53 -337.03
Note: This table presents exponentiated coe cient estimates (hazard ratios) from Cox regressions
that include variables measuring the athlete’s pre-Olympic ranking. The first column replicates
the main results from Table 2 on the sub-sample with available ranking data. Column 2 adds the
di erence between the athlete’s pre-Olympic rank and his Olympic finish and Column 3 adds an
indicator variable for whether this di erence exceeds 20 places. In both Columns 2 and 3, beating
expectations is correlated with a lower hazard of death, but the e ect of losing remains statistically
significant and is of a similar magnitude to the result in Column 1. Column 4 includes an indicator
for being ranked 1st prior to the Olympics and the interaction of this variable with losing. The large
and statistically significant coe cient estimate on the interaction of 5.055 indicates that “favorites”
who lose die earlier than other losers. Robust t-statistics clustered by country-year in parentheses.
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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Table 20: Distribution of Occupations and Average Earnings (1950 US Dollars)
All U.S. Males aged 20+ Gold medalists Silver medalists
in Labor Force





Professional Workers 4.0 4,340 25.0 4,375 68.0 4,994
Proprietors, Managers, O cials (Except Farm) 8.8 4,090 31.3 4,080 8.0 3,950
Semiprofessional Workers 0.8 3,167 12.5 3,200 4.0 3,200
Craftsmen, Foremen, and Kindred Workers 14.8 3,001 0 - 0 -
Clerical Workers 7.2 2,651 6.3 3,600 8.0 2,500
Salesmen & Saleswomen 5.8 2,547 18.8 2,800 4.0 2,400
Operatives and Kindred Workers 17.0 2,474 0 - 0 -
Protective Service Workers 1.8 2,294 0 - 0 -
Laborers (Except Farm) 13.5 1,968 6.3 2,000 4.0 2,000
Service Workers (Except Domestic and
Protective) 4.2 1,696 0 - 0 -
Farmers and Farm Managers 14.1 1,406 0 - 4.0 1,400
Farm Laborers and Foremen 7.5 813 0 - 0 -
Domestic Service Workers 0.5 599 0 - 0 -
Total 100 2,404 100 3,644 100 4,272
Note: This table presents the percent of Gold medalists, Silver medalists, and the male U.S. labor force aged 20 and older by occupational
category in 1940 from the U.S. Census. The average earnings by category are constructed from finer 3-digit occupation codes and reported
in the IPUMS Census data file. Columns 1 and 2 are tabulated using the 100 percent IPUMS 1940 Census file, which excludes identifying
information but provides 3-digit occupation codes and corresponding earnings. Silver medalists pursued higher-paying occupations than Gold
medalists.
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Table 21: Cox Regressions with 1940 U.S. Census Variables
U.S. sub-sample: Complete Census data U.S. sub-sample: Complete Census
and pre-Olympics rank data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Lose (1=yes, 0=no) 0.325* 0.543 0.491 0.643 0.591 0.266** 0.270** 0.417 0.392 0.329
(-1.92) (-0.98) (-1.09) (-0.77) (-0.88) (-2.12) (-2.06) (-1.36) (-1.19) (-1.32)
Log wage income ($100s), annual 0.646** 0.656** 0.645** 0.659*
(-2.50) (-2.34) (-2.16) (-1.72)
Wage income ($100s), annual 0.962*** 0.957***
(-2.68) (-3.04)
Income from other sources 0.067** 0.085** 0.245** 0.055** 0.073** 0.189**
(1=yes, 0=no) (-2.57) (-2.42) (-2.07) (-2.57) (-2.42) (-2.05)
Owned home (1=yes, 0=no) 1.864 1.312 1.820 1.723 1.632 1.654 1.396
(0.91) (0.51) (0.90) (0.82) (0.66) (0.69) (0.48)
Number of weeks worked in 1939 1.066 1.061 1.106* 1.082 1.160**
(1.25) (1.31) (1.84) (1.27) (2.40)
White (1=yes, 0=no) 0.818 1.401 1.223 1.896 0.847 0.655 0.660 1.562 2.341 0.864
(-0.39) (0.76) (0.22) (1.10) (-0.20) (-0.66) (-0.64) (0.71) (1.42) (-0.21)
Married (1=yes, 0=no) 0.349* 0.962 0.570 1.472 2.600 0.683 0.611 1.606 6.787 32.684
(-1.85) (-0.06) (-0.59) (0.57) (0.92) (-0.55) (-0.40) (0.41) (1.04) (1.59)
Di erence between pre-Olympic 1.005 0.970 0.947 0.936
ranking and Olympic finish (0.14) (-0.92) (-1.25) (-1.37)
Height (cm) 1.155*** 1.201*** 1.144*** 1.200*** 1.186*** 1.160*** 1.162** 1.191*** 1.181*** 1.178***
(2.79) (3.40) (2.75) (3.32) (3.40) (2.69) (2.46) (3.34) (3.30) (3.46)
Modified R2 based on Royston (2006) 0.308 0.580 0.351 0.595 0.541 0.284 0.284 0.562 0.595 0.569
Observations 39 39 38 38 38 36 36 36 35 35
Log likelihood -95.90 -83.52 -90.86 -79.63 -82.47 -86.70 -86.68 -75.30 -70.63 -71.94
Note: This table presents exponentiated coe cient estimates (hazard ratios) from Cox regressions for the U.S. sub-sample with data from
the 1940 Census. All regressions include year and event class e ects as well as year of birth (which is not significant). Robust t-statistics in
parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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Table 22: Cox Regressions with Parental Income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Imputation of parental income based on: Imputation of parental income based on:
1925 Industry classification 1940 Occupational classification
Income measured in: Income measured in:
Logs Levels Levels Levels Logs Levels Levels Levels
Lose (1=yes, 0=no) 0.520 0.524 0.443 0.456 0.546 0.492 0.468 0.471
(-1.09) (-0.80) (-1.14) (-1.17) (-0.99) (-1.21) (-0.94) (-1.00)
Athlete’s wage income ($100s), annual 0.597*** 0.958* 0.583** 0.952***
(-2.63) (-1.93) (-2.27) (-2.97)
Parent’s wage income ($100s), annual 0.861 0.972 0.484 0.943
(-0.14) (-0.28) (-0.46) (-1.22)
Athlete’s income minus parent’s income 0.964*** 0.966*** 0.970** 0.974*
($100s) (-3.50) (-3.00) (-2.57) (-1.79)
Athlete’s income from other sources 0.085** 0.277* 0.332 0.063* 0.134* 0.447
(1=yes, 0=no) (-2.17) (-1.68) (-1.57) (-1.79) (-1.78) (-1.16)
Number of weeks worked in 1939 1.054 1.105 1.105 1.089 1.068 1.155* 1.075 1.064
(1.10) (1.54) (1.60) (1.36) (1.27) (1.73) (1.21) (1.04)
White (1=yes, 0=no) 1.650 0.722 0.553 0.626 2.498 1.905 0.399 0.465
(0.65) (-0.33) (-0.53) (-0.44) (0.73) (0.47) (-0.78) (-0.60)
Height (cm) 1.245*** 1.212*** 1.217*** 1.199*** 1.239*** 1.222*** 1.217*** 1.196***
(3.64) (3.41) (3.11) (3.47) (3.97) (3.92) (3.13) (2.99)
Modified R2 based on Royston (2006) 0.642 0.557 0.509 0.547 0.645 0.582 0.499 0.520
Observations 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37
Log likelihood -73.94 -78.59 -80.92 -79.02 -73.71 -77.31 -81.39 -80.37
Note: This table presents exponentiated coe cient estimates (hazard ratios) from Cox regressions for the U.S. sub-sample with data from the
1940 Census along with parental income based on occupations collected in the 1910, 1920, and 1930 U.S. Census. All regressions include year
and event class e ects, as well as year of birth, and indicators for married and home ownership (none of which are significant as in Table IX).
Parental income does not enter significantly while the variables for athlete income is large and statistically significant. Robust t-statistics in
parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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Table 23: Cox Regressions with News Coverage Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
U.S. sub-sample: Complete Census data
Lose (1=yes, 0=no) 0.271** 0.304** 0.687 0.590
(-2.13) (-2.16) (-0.62) (-0.93)
Count of news stories 0.997 0.998 0.997
(-1.14) (-0.66) (-0.78)
Count of news stories > 50 0.431 1.607 1.261
(1=yes, 0=no) (-1.01) (0.57) (0.25)
Log wage income ($100s), annual 0.655** 0.654** 0.657** 0.664**
(-2.49) (-2.47) (-2.36) (-2.26)
Income from other sources 0.078** 0.067** 0.084** 0.071**
(1=yes, 0=no) (-2.55) (-2.43) (-2.44) (-2.36)
Owned home (1=yes, 0=no) 1.814 1.554 1.856 1.610
(0.92) (0.66) (0.91) (0.66)
Number of weeks worked in 1939 1.079 1.069 1.067 1.059
(1.34) (1.54) (1.12) (1.30)
White (1=yes, 0=no) 0.681 0.914 2.258 2.320 2.018 2.130
(-0.63) (-0.15) (1.40) (1.36) (1.10) (1.24)
Married (1=yes, 0=no) 0.344* 0.289* 1.649 1.305 1.542 1.160
(-1.87) (-1.92) (0.76) (0.38) (0.63) (0.20)
Year of birth 0.926 0.938 1.056 1.065 1.039 1.042
(-0.71) (-0.50) (0.41) (0.51) (0.28) (0.32)
Height (cm) 1.168*** 1.155*** 1.183*** 1.203*** 1.194*** 1.210***
(3.03) (2.98) (3.10) (2.87) (3.12) (3.05)
Modified R2 based on Royston
(2006)
0.348 0.361 0.591 0.593 0.594 0.603
Observations 39 39 38 38 38 38
Log likelihood -95.27 -95.24 -79.83 -79.65 -79.59 -79.10
Note: This table presents exponentiated coe cient estimates (hazard ratios) from Cox regressions
for the U.S. sub-sample with data from the 1940 Census, along with variables for news coverage. All
regressions include year and event class e ects. The variables for news coverage do not enter signifi-
cantly and the estimates for income remain large and statistically significant. Robust t-statistics in
parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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Table 24: Robustness Test: Lifespan Calculated as Years post-Olympics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cox Cox Gompertz Gompertz
Lose (1=yes, 0=no) 0.571*** 0.571*** 0.543*** 0.547***
(-2.91) (-2.87) (-3.28) (-3.19)
Year of birth 0.859*** 0.859*** 0.846*** 0.847***
(-3.52) (-3.52) (-3.88) (-3.85)
Ever set World Record 0.991 0.841
(1=yes, 0=no) (-0.03) (-0.51)
Year e ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Event e ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country e ects No No No No
Event class e ects No No No No
Frailty None None Individual Individual
Observations 170 170 170 170
Log likelihood -671.80 -671.80 60.08 60.13
Note: In these regressions, the dependent variable is years of life calculated beginning from the
first Olympic games the athlete competed in, rather than their date of birth. The exponentiated
coe cient estimates (hazard ratios) are similar to the main results presented in Table II. Robust
t-statistics clustered by country-year in parentheses, except in shared frailty models in columns 3
and 4. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
128
Table 25: Robustness Test: Cox Regressions Excluding Each Year in Turn























Lose (1=yes, 0=no) 0.563*** 0.565*** 0.504*** 0.496*** 0.553*** 0.576*** 0.616** 0.596** 0.572*** 0.527*** 0.608**
(-3.01) (-2.91) (-3.34) (-3.81) (-2.71) (-2.84) (-2.56) (-2.40) (-2.76) (-3.32) (-2.27)
Year of birth 0.978 0.960 0.932 0.961 0.983 0.924** 0.952 0.948 0.967 0.967 0.990
(-0.56) (-1.03) (-1.34) (-0.99) (-0.39) (-2.19) (-1.15) (-1.36) (-0.87) (-0.72) (-0.20)
Year e ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Event e ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country e ects No No No No No No No No No No No
Observations 161 164 159 159 151 152 154 150 152 150 148
Log likelihood -631.35 -649.23 -619.12 -621.86 -581.05 -581.21 -596.54 -578.60 -584.90 -575.90 -570.67
Note: This table presents exponentiated coe cient estimates (hazard ratios) from Cox regressions that exclude one year at a time from the
sample. The results are not sensitive to dropping any single year from the analysis. Robust t-statistics clustered by country-year in parentheses.
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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Table 26: Robustness Test: Cox Regressions Including Other Olympic Finalists
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Sample: 1st vs. 2nd - 4th places Sample: 1st vs. 2nd - 8th places
Lose (1=yes, 0=no) 0.659*** 0.660*** 0.695** 0.696** 0.710*** 0.710*** 0.694*** 0.694***
(-2.99) (-2.99) (-2.49) (-2.49) (-3.27) (-3.27) (-3.30) (-3.30)
Year of birth 1.004 1.004 0.987*** 0.987*** 1.010 1.009 0.988*** 0.988***
(0.18) (0.21) (-2.96) (-2.94) (0.76) (0.75) (-3.61) (-3.60)
Ever set World Record 0.875 0.873 1.051 0.980
(1=yes, 0=no) (-0.27) (-0.28) (0.09) (-0.04)
Year e ects Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No
Individual event e ects Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No
Country e ects No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Event class e ects No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Observations 350 350 350 350 562 562 562 562
Log likelihood -1678.24 -1678.19 -1677.79 -1677.73 -2965.38 -2965.37 -2969.43 -2969.43
Note: This table presents exponentiated coe cient estimates (hazard ratios) from Cox regressions that include other finalists. Columns 1 to
4 present results that compare Gold medalists to places 2 through 4 and Columns 5 through 8 compare Gold medalists to places 2 through 8.
The results are similar to the main results presented in Tables 2 and 3. Robust t-statistics clustered by country-year (Columns 1, 2, 5, 6) or
by event-year (Columns 3, 4, 7, 8) in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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